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Foreword by the EBA 
Sustainable economic growth trough sustainable businesses is vital 
for achieving the ambitious goals under the 2030 agenda and for job 
creation in poor countries. A precondition for this is more and 
better (sustainable) investments in the world’s poor countries.  
Swedens Development Finance Institution Swedfund was 
established in 1979. Initially, the task was to transfer Swedish 
knowledge of entrepreneurship and enterprise to developing 
countries. Today, Swedfund’s mandate is to invest in poor countries, 
through equity acquisitions in individual companies, through funds 
or through lending. The overarching objective is the same as the 
objective for Sweden’s international aid – to “create preconditions 
for better living conditions for people living in poverty and under 
oppression”.  
Swedfund has, since its inception, invested in more than 260 
companies in low and middle-income countries and the total 
contracted amount in the portfolio at the end of 2016 amounted to 
around SEK 4 billion. During the last years, there has been a surge 
among donors in business-oriented assistance or development 
finance. The Swedish Government has completed several capital 
injections to Swedfund (400 MSEK in 2016 and 2017, respectively), 
and additional injections for 2018-2020 (600 MSEK yearly) were 
announced in the budget bill for 2018. Looking at it from an 
international perspective, however, Swedfund is still one of the 
smallest Development Finance Institutions in Europe.  
In 2008, EBA's predecessor, Sadev, published an evaluation of 
Swedfund which concluded that Swedfund’s additionality was 
unclear, that Swedfund achieved its goals, though there were also 
criticism for not following up with all companies it invests in. The 
present study, by Stephen Spratt, Peter O’Flynn and Justin Flynn 
from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) is an attempt to 
assess Swedfund’s development impact a decade later. The 
evaluation concludes: “…it is not possible to say definitively 
whether Swedfund has reduced poverty through its activities (… [ 
but we] …) find indications that Swedfund is having a positive 
impact on poverty in some respects, and may also have positively 
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affected the ESG [environmental, social and governance] 
performance of the firms in which it invests”. The report also 
examines how Swedfund could increase its poverty impact and how 
this could be robustly measured and used to improve impact over 
time. One recommendation is that Swedfund needs to strengthen 
its work on long-term follow-up of core indicators, not least in 
terms of tax and employment.  
It is my hope that this report will find its intended audience 
among a broad public with an interest in development finance, 
development cooperation and sustainable poverty reduction.  
The authors’ work has been conducted in dialogue with a 
reference group chaired by Kim Forss, member of the EBA. 
However, the authors are solely responsible for the content of the 
report. 
Gothenburg, April 2018  
 
Helena Lindholm  
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Sammanfattning 
Utvecklingsfinansiärer (Development Finance Institutions, DFIs) 
har fått en allt viktigare roll för utveckling. Den andel av det 
offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet (ODA) som fördelas till DFIs ökar 
också i de flesta givarländer. Det här tydliggör att en utveckling av 
den privata sektorn är prioriterad internationellt, och att 
finansiering av företag i låginkomstländer uppfattas som viktigt för 
att nå de hållbara utvecklingsmålen. Om den nuvarande trenden 
fortsätter kommer också investeringarna via utvecklingsfinansiärer 
efterhand att överstiga det traditionella offentliga utvecklings-
biståndet. Mycket beror alltså på om dessa investeringar faktiskt 
lyckas. 
Mot bakgrund av detta ligger följande fråga i fokus i den här 
utvärderingen: Har de investeringar som gjorts av Svenska statens 
utvecklingsfinansiär Swedfund bidragit till fattigdomsreducering 
och, om så är fallet, i vilken utsträckning och på vilket sätt? 
Vi kan i utvärderingen se tecken på att Swedfunds aktiviteter 
bidrar positivt till att minska fattigdomen, men frågan kan utifrån 
tillgängliga data inte besvaras slutgiltigt.  
Man kan närma sig frågan på två olika sätt, och båda används i 
studien. Vi börjar med att titta på investeringarna utifrån länder och 
sektorer, och bedömer om det är sannolikt att de minskar 
fattigdomen. Denna analys ex-ante (på förhand) visar att Swedfund 
huvudsakligen investerar i länder där finansieringen utgör ett 
komplement till vad som redan finns tillgängligt. Utgångspunkten är 
att kompletterande investeringar i kapitalsvaga länder med hög 
fattigdomsnivå rimligen borde få en positiv effekt, och därigenom 
sannolikt även minska fattigdomen. Faktum är att Swedfund arbetar 
med att rikta om hela portföljen mot investeringar i 
låginkomstländer och att de här effekterna därmed kan förväntas 
öka med tiden. 
Tittar vi på fördelning utifrån sektorer framträder en mer 
blandad bild. Även om Swedfund fokuserar på sektorer som 
potentiellt kan generera en hög sysselsättning (t.ex. tillverkning) har 
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investeringar inom jordbruket fasats ut, trots bevis för att det inom 
den här sektorn finns störst potential för att minska fattigdomen. 
Samtidigt, och i likhet med flera andra utvecklingsfinansiärer, har 
Swedfund ökat fördelningen till den finansiella sektorn. Utöver 
tecken på ett mer generellt positivt samband mellan utveckling av 
den finansiella sektorn och tillväxt finns det få belägg för att den här 
formen av investeringar skulle vara särskilt positiv vad gäller 
fattigdomsbekämpning. 
I vår bedömning ex-ante drar vi därför slutsatsen att Swedfunds 
investeringar sannolikt minskar fattigdomen, men att den positiva 
effekten kan förstärkas med en tydligare inriktning mot 
fattigdomsbekämpande sektorer och om portföljen snabbare 
inriktas på investeringar i låginkomstländer.  
Den andra metoden för att bedöma effekt går ut på att undersöka 
förändringar i viktiga utvecklingsindikatorer under och efter 
investeringarna (ex-post). Swedfund tillhandahöll data inom fyra 
områden för efterhandsutvärderingen: finansiellt resultat, 
sysselsättning, beskattning och för ESG-resultat (miljömässig och 
social styrning). Innan resultaten undersöks krävs några allmänna 
förtydliganden angående dessa data.  
Swedfund är för det första en förhållandevis liten verksamhet. 
Det innebär att både nuvarande och tidigare portföljer är små. Det 
utesluter i sig de flesta kvantitativa utvärderingstekniker och medför 
att synliga mönster i data kan vara starkt påverkade av ett fåtal 
investeringar, ibland endast en. 
Tillhandahållna data har, för det andra, endast varit tillgängliga 
för ett begränsat antal år. I vissa fall tre år, och ibland endast två år. 
Detta betyder inte att Swedfund inte har samlat in data tidigare, utan 
att äldre data inte är jämförbara och därför inte kan användas för 
utvärdering. Utvecklingsfinansiärer som Swedfund tar även 
regelbundet emot anvisningar från regeringen om nya 
fokusområden, vilket kräver att nya indikatorer måste identifieras 
och följas. Utvärderings- och uppföljningstrenderna bland 
utvecklingsfinansiärer utvecklas ständigt, vilket även det leder till att 
nya indikatorer börjar användas. Bristen på en enhetlig uppsättning 
indikatorer gör det svårt att göra jämförelser över tid. 
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För det tredje saknades ofta data från den tidpunkt då 
investeringen gjordes (baseline). Det här gör att vi inte kunnat se 
vilka förändringar som har inträffat under investeringens livscykel, 
vi har endast kunnat följa utvecklingen under de två eller tre år som 
data fanns tillgängliga. Följden är att positiva (eller negativa) effekter 
kan ha inträffat tidigare under investeringslivscykeln, men att det 
ofta är omöjligt att veta. 
För det fjärde förlitade sig de finansiella data som tillhandahölls 
för 2013–2015 på uppgifter från uppgiftslämnare, och 
svarsfrekvensen var inte jämnt fördelad över 
indikatoruppsättningen. För 2014 var svarsfrekvensen 72 procent 
för frågorna om sysselsättning, medan den endast var 31 procent för 
frågorna om betald skatt. Analysen försvåras också ytterligare av att 
dataunderlaget redan från början bestod av få observationer.  
Swedfunds angreppssätt vid arbetet med ESG-frågorna är 
relativt nytt, detta begränsar de slutsatser som kan dras om den 
slutliga effekten på det området.  
Med dessa förbehåll gick det dock att dra följande slutsatser om 
resultaten ex-post.  
Finansiellt sett ökade intäkterna för Swedfunds investerings-
företag från 2013–2015, både totalt och i genomsnitt. Ökningen 
berodde till stor del på utvecklingen i låneportföljen och i mindre 
utsträckning på kapitalinvesteringar i enskilda företag. Som kontrast 
var resultaten för kapitalinvesteringar via fonder sämre under 
samma period, förlusterna var koncentrerade till ett fåtal större 
investeringar. Det är viktigt att notera att vi inte kan avgöra om 
portföljens förbättrade finansiella resultat berodde på Swedfunds 
åtgärder. Så kan vara fallet, men orsaken kan även vara en ökad andel 
lån i portföljen, och att lån tenderar att ge ett bättre resultat än aktier. 
Det här tydliggör de risker som en relativt liten 
utvecklingsfinansiär, som Swedfund, ställs inför. Storleken gör att 
det finns gränser för hur mycket risk som kan undvikas genom 
diversifiering och riskspridning. Eftersom Swedfund nu allt mer 
fokuserar på låginkomstländer där riskerna sannolikt är högre, kan 
detta med tiden bli ett större problem. En lösning vore att minska 
risken i portföljen – exempelvis genom att öka graden av lån i 
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portföljen eller investera i mindre riskabla företag – men det kan 
samtidigt medföra att utvecklingsinsatsernas effekter minskar.  
Nedan diskuteras några andra förslag på hur denna viktiga fråga 
kan hanteras. 
Vad gäller sysselsättningen syns små övergripande effekter i 
portföljen, varken positiva eller negativa. Detta döljer dock stora 
variationer. Swedfunds aktieportfölj uppvisar en nettoförlust vad 
gäller arbetstillfällen. Förlusten är oproportionerligt koncentrerad 
till äldre investeringar, investeringar i Asien och inom tillverkning, 
samt investeringar som gjorts genom aktiefonder. Som en kontrast 
uppvisade låneportföljen en nettoökning av antalet arbetstillfällen, 
särskilt för nyare lån och lån i Afrika. 
Det viktigaste som framkom vid analysen avseende inbetald skatt 
var att mängden data är för begränsad för att möjliggöra 
meningsfulla slutsatser. Det fanns till exempel bara användbara data 
för två år. Sett i dessa tillgängliga data varierar också nivån för 
betalda skatter kraftigt och den förefaller påverkas starkt av typ av 
finansiering, samt händelser under det aktuella året. Det kan delvis 
förklaras av mycket små urval, av de skäl som beskrivs ovan. Det är 
också så att betald skatt under ett visst år kan variera kraftigt av 
orsaker som inte har samband med företagets framgång, dess 
villighet att betala skatt eller insatserna från Swedfund. Temporära 
eller riktade skattelättnader kan till exempel vara en orsak. Företag 
kan även investera kraftigt under ett visst år, vilket minskar vinsten 
och därmed den mängd skatt som ska betalas.  
Oavsett dessa datafrågor är det tydligt att Swedfund tar 
skattefrågan på allvar. Företag med komplexa 
organisationsstrukturer som syftar till att artificiellt sänka de skatter 
som ska betalas sorteras bort under due diligence fasen, och 
Swedfund uppmuntrar alla investeringsobjekt att betala sin beskärda 
del. Vid en årlig uppföljning efterfrågar man att skatter ska redovisas 
landvis, vilket är viktigt. Multinationella företag rapporterar ofta 
skatt ur ett sammanslaget, globalt perspektiv vilket gör det omöjligt 
att avgöra mängden betald skatt i respektive land, och hur detta kan 
jämföras med vad som skulle ha betalats med tanke på vinsterna i 
dessa länder. Aktivister på skatteområdet har länge tryckt på för en 
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landsuppdelad rapportering, och Swedfund förtjänar beröm för att 
man går i den här riktningen. 
Vad gäller ESG-frågorna genomför Swedfund årligen en 
undersökning bland investeringsobjekten. 2014 bestod den av 132 
frågor. Vissa handlade om utfall eller påverkan (t.ex. C02-
utsläppsnivåer) och övriga berörde processer och riktlinjer (t.ex. 
efterlevnad av ILO:s riktlinjer). Som redan nämnts ovan har ESG-
indikatorerna dock förändrats mycket över tiden. För att säkerställa 
jämförbarhet och fokus på kärnfrågor har utvärderingsteamet här 
utvecklat ett eget ESG-index baserat på 30 frågor. Utifrån detta kan 
vi ge investeringsobjekten en ESG-poäng som kan användas som 
utgångspunkt för jämförelser.  
På portföljnivå ser vi ingen förändring i ESG-resultat. Med tanke 
på att data endast sträcker sig två år bakåt i tiden är det egentligen 
inte förvånande. Delar vi upp portföljen framträder en bild där lån 
presterar bättre än aktier, både vad gäller total poäng och 
förbättringar sett över perioden. Regionalt sett presterar afrikanska 
investeringar sämst vad gäller ESG-frågor. De latinamerikanska 
investeringarna får högst poäng och de asiatiska och europeiska 
investeringarna placerar sig i mitten. 
Det är intressant att äldre investeringar har gett bättre resultat än 
nyare investeringar. Det antyder att Swedfund påverkar 
investeringsobjekten positivt över tiden. Det finns även ett 
eventuellt samband mellan investeringsstorlek och positiva ESG-
utfall. Detta kan delvis förklaras av att större företag har mer 
resurser som de kan avsätta för ESG-frågor, men även att Swedfund 
kan utöva ett större inflytande vid större investeringar. Som med alla 
de ex-post resultat som redovisas här tydliggör de tidigare beskrivna 
frågetecknen kring dataunderlaget att det här är preliminära snarare 
än definitiva slutsatser. 
Mot bakgrund av frågorna om data och urvalsstorlek som har 
tagits upp ovan kan vi inte säga mer än så. Det är möjligt att 
Swedfunds inverkan är större eller mindre. Vi vet helt enkelt inte. 
Det här väcker två viktiga frågor: Vad kan Swedfund göra för att 
tydligt öka de fattigdomsminskande effekterna? Går det, för det 
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andra, att ta fram tillförlitliga mätmetoder som kan användas för att 
förbättra effekterna på sikt? 
Gällande den första frågan så tvingas Swedfund kompromissa. 
Den potentiella effekten kommer att bli störst i länder, regioner och 
sektorer där investeringsbehovet också är som störst. Trots att den 
potentiella effekten är störst där så kommer dock samtidigt 
möjligheten att förverkliga resultaten att tydligt påverkas av faktorer 
som institutionell kvalitet och investeringsklimat. Riskerna kommer 
sannolikt också att vara högre. Som studien visar står Swedfund 
inför betydande finansiella risker, där förluster ofta koncentreras till 
ett fåtal investeringar. Den ökande andelen lån i portföljen som vi 
har sett är en reaktion på detta. En alternativ lösning skulle vara 
investeringar med lägre risker, men det skulle undergräva de effekter 
som Swedfund försöker uppnå, och även kunna sätta i fråga i vilken 
utsträckning investeringarna faktiskt utgör additionell finansiering. 
Vi föreslår två positiva sätt för att ta itu med detta. Ett fokus på 
högre risk skulle kunna påskynda investeringar med potentiellt 
större effekt, samtidigt som man accepterar att förlusterna kan bli 
högre och att Swedfund inte kan vara helt finansiellt 
självförsörjande. Det skulle kräva regelbundna statliga 
kapitaltillskott, men dessa kan samtidigt motiveras utifrån just den 
större effekten. 
Swedfund skulle, för det andra, kunna upprättthålla finansiell 
självförsörjning om riskerna mildrades genom en ökad 
diversifiering. Detta skulle dock kräva att Swedfund var större än 
vad det är idag. Även den här lösningen skulle kräva att staten 
skjuter till kapital, men endast i form av en engångsinjektion som 
låter Swedfund nå en storlek där riskerna bättre kan diversifieras. I 
båda fallen skulle ökade ansträngningar för att förbättra 
investeringsklimatet i fokusländerna också vara ett viktigt 
komplement till investeringarna. I stället för att försöka göra det här 
direkt vore det lämpligt att sök partnerskap med andra 
utvecklingsaktörer med mer kunskap och inflytande inom dessa 
frågor. 
Båda alternativen kräver ytterligare kapital. För att motivera detta 
skulle Swedfund behöva öka sina effekter och även visa tydligare 
vad de åstadkommer. Det i sin tur leder oss tillbaka till den andra 
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frågan ovan: Hur kan effekter mätas på ett robust sätt, och vilka 
mekanismer leder till större effekter framöver? 
Med en större portfölj av investeringar skulle Swedfund få hjälp 
med att lösa frågan om urvalsstorlekar. 
 Swedfund följer, i likhet med övriga utvecklingsfinansiärer 
(DFIs), en omfattande och skiftande uppsättning indikatorer. Det 
här är problematiskt av två skäl. Viktiga indikatorer separeras för det 
första inte från mindre viktiga indikatorer, vilket kan medföra att de 
viktiga försvinner i mängden. För det andra så kan en omfattande 
uppsättning indikatorer göra det svårt att säkerställa att vissa 
indikatorer inte motsäger varandra. Snarare än att mäta ännu mer 
vore det bättre att fastställa vilka effekter som är viktigast, och 
därefter välja det lägsta antalet indikatorer som behövs för att följa 
just detta. 
Indikatorerna ska dessutom utformas så att innebörden inte blir 
otydlig eller kan missförstås. För skattefrågor bör det till exempel 
alltid framgå tydligt hur mycket skatt som betalas inom varje 
jurisdiktion som en andel av vinsten. Det är föga meningsfullt att 
samla in data om så inte är fallet. Tillförlitlig utvärdering kräver även 
jämförbara indikatorer som används över längre tidsperioder. En 
fråga är också vad data faktiskt fångar. Inom vissa områden är 
svarsfrekvensen för Swedfunds årliga undersökning alltför låg. En 
lösning kan vara att se till att investeringsobjekten enligt avtal 
förbinder sig att svara på undersökningen.  
Förutom dessa efterhandsåtgärder rekommenderar vi även att 
Swedfund utvecklar ett tydligare ramverk för förhandsbedömningar 
av investeringar för att på så sätt öka effekterna. I studien går vi 
igenom litteraturen på områden där Swedfund potentiellt kan skapa 
ytterligare effekt. Förutom lands- och sektorval, ingår val av 
investeringsobjekt och förvaltnings- och styrningseffekter. I ett 
senare skede bör ett sådant ramverk också byggas på information 
om Swedfunds resultat (ex post), där resultaten belyser sektor- och 
projektval, eller det bästa sättet att framgångsrikt och långsiktigt 
arbeta med investeringsobjekten.  
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Sammanfattningsvis är våra rekommendationer: 
• Swedfunds fokus på låginkomstländer och 
sektorer med den största potentiella 
utvecklingseffekten inom dessa länder bör 
stärkas. 
• För att möta den ökade investeringsrisken som det här 
medför föreslår vi två alternativa strategier: 
(i) Swedfund blir en mer specialiserad 
utvecklingsfinansiär som fokuserar på 
investeringar med hög risk/hög effekt, 
och som samtidigt accepterar 
portföljförluster och hanterar detta 
genom regelbundna kapitaltillskott från 
regeringen. 
(ii) Swedfund expanderar och minskar riskerna 
genom att utveckla en mer diversifierad 
portfölj. Det skulle möjliggöra ett fortsatt 
fokus på investeringar med hög risk/hög 
effekt inom ramen för en mer diversifierad 
portfölj. Samtidigt som det gör det möjligt att 
fortsatt vara finansiellt självförsörjande, krävs 
ett stort engångskapitaltillskott. 
• Eftersom investeringsklimatet i de olika länderna 
inverkar på möjligheten att förverkliga potentialen 
bör Swedfund samråda med utvecklingsaktörer 
med inriktning på dessa frågor. 
• Swedfund bör fokusera på ett litet antal centrala 
målsättningar i fråga om effekt, och utveckla ett 
mindre antal indikatorer som gör det möjligt att 
följa just dessa effekter. 
• Ett ramverk bör tas fram för att på förhand välja 
investeringar med största möjliga potentiell effekt. 
• Indikatorer bör utformas för att vara entydiga och 
meningsfulla. 
• Grundläggande data bör samlas in vid 
investeringstidpunkten, och ett antal 
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effektindikatorer bör löpande samlas in under 
investeringens livslängd. Investeringsobjekten bör 
vara skyldiga att svara. 
• Mer tid bör ägnas åt att följa upp avslutade investeringar. 
• Ändamålsenliga utvärderingsmetoder bör 
användas. De bör i allmänhet bestå av en 
blandning av kvantitativa och kvalitativa 
metoder där frågor om kausalitet och attribution 
ges full vikt. 
• Resultaten i efterhandsbedömningar av effekt bör 
användas som underlag för sektor- och projektval 
för en dynamisk förbättring av utvecklingsresultaten 
över tid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
12 
  
  
 
13 
 
Summary 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) are increasingly 
important development actors. The proportion of ODA being 
allocated to DFIs is increasing in most countries, reflecting the 
greater priority being given to private sector development, and the 
belief that supplying finance to firms in low-income countries is an 
essential part of meeting the Sustainable Development Goals. If 
current trends continue, DFI funding will ultimately outstrip 
traditional ODA. Much depends on their success. 
It is within this context that this evaluation addresses the 
following question: Have the investments undertaken by Swedfund 
contributed to poverty reduction and, if so, to what extent and how?  
While we find indications that Swedfund is having a positive 
impact on poverty through its activities, it is not possible to 
definitively answer this question based on the data made available 
to us.  
There are two ways of approaching the question, both of which 
were undertaken in the study. First, we can look at the investments 
in terms of countries and sectors, and assess whether these would 
be likely to reduce poverty. This ex ante assessment finds that 
Swedfund largely invests in countries where their finance would be 
additional to what is available. Based on the reasonable assumption 
that additional investment in capital-scarce countries with high 
poverty rates will have a positive effect, this is likely to reduce 
poverty. It is also the case that Swedfund is shifting its full portfolio 
to investments in low-income countries, so these effects can be 
expected to increase over time. 
On sectorial allocations, the picture is more mixed. Although 
Swedfund does focus on sectors with high employment generation 
potential (e.g. manufacturing), it has phased out investments in 
agriculture, despite the evidence that this sector has the greatest 
poverty-reduction potential. At the same time, as with a number of 
DFIs, Swedfund has increased its allocation to the financial sector. 
Beyond general findings of a positive relationship between financial 
       
14 
sector development and growth, there is little evidence that this will 
be particularly positive in terms of poverty reduction.  
Our ex ante assessment therefore concludes that Swedfund’s 
investments are likely to be having a positive impact on poverty, but 
that this could be increased with a greater concentration on poverty-
reducing sectors, and an acceleration of the portfolio shift towards 
low-income country investments.  
The second way of assessing impact is to examine changes in key 
development indicators during and after investments. For this ex 
post assessment, Swedfund provided us with data in four areas: 
financial performance; employment; tax; and ESG (environmental, 
social, governance). Before considering the findings, some general 
points about the data need to be made.  
First, Swedfund is a relatively small institution. As a result, its 
current and historical portfolio is also quite small. As well as 
precluding most quantitative evaluation techniques, this means that 
the changes we see can be heavily skewed by a small number of 
investments, sometimes even one.  
Second, the data provided was only available for a small number 
of years. This was three years in some cases, but only two in others. 
This does not mean that Swedfund did not collect data before this, 
but rather that earlier data is not comparable and so cannot be used 
for evaluation purposes. DFIs such as Swedfund receive regular 
instructions from governments to focus on new areas, requiring new 
indicators to be identified and tracked. Also, M&E trends within the 
DFI community are constantly evolving, which again often leads to 
the adoption of new indicators. The resulting lack of a consistent 
set of indicators make comparison over time very difficult.  
Third, no baseline data was available to capture the situation at 
the point of investments. As a result, we cannot say what changes 
have occurred over the life of investments, as we can only see what 
has happened during the two or three year that data is available. This 
means that positive (or negative) impacts could have occurred at 
earlier stages of the investment, but we have no way of knowing 
this.  
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Fourth, while financial data was provided for 2013-15, these were 
reliant on stakeholder information which was not available evenly 
across the indicator set. For example, in 2014 the response rate of 
those surveyed on employment was 72 percent but for tax paid it 
was 31 percent. Given that sample sizes are quite small anyway, this 
further constrains the analysis.  
Finally, Swedfund’s approach to ESG issues is relatively new, 
limiting the conclusions that can be drawn on the impact it may 
ultimately generate.  
With these caveats in mind, the following ex post results were 
obtained.  
On financial performance, 2013-15 saw revenues grow for 
Swedfund’s investee companies, both in total and on average. This 
growth, however, was driven by the loan portfolio, and to a lesser 
extent, equity investments in individual firms. Equity investment 
through funds, in contrast, performed poorly over the same period, 
with losses concentrated in a few large investments. It is important 
to note that we cannot say that the improved financial performance 
of the portfolio was the result of Swedfund’s actions. This may be 
the case, but it may also be because the proportion of loans in the 
portfolio has increased, and loans tend to perform better than 
equities.  
This highlights the risks that a relatively small DFI such as 
Swedfund faces. Given its size, there are limits to how much risks 
can be diversified away. As Swedfund is increasingly focusing on 
lower-income countries where risks are likely to be higher, this 
problem may become greater over time. One response to this would 
be to reduce the risk in the portfolio – by increasing the weight of 
loans, or investing in less risky ventures, for example – but this may 
result in lower development impacts. Other options to address this 
important issue are considered below.   
On employment, the overall portfolio shows little impacts, 
positive or negative. This masks considerable variation, however. 
Swedfund’s equity portfolio saw a net loss of jobs, which were 
disproportionately concentrated in older investments, investments 
in Asia, manufacturing, and investments made through equity funds. 
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The loan portfolio, in contrast, saw net job creation, particularly in 
more recent loans, and those located in Africa.  
The most important thing to emerge from the analysis of tax is 
that the data is too limited to allow meaningful conclusions. Usable 
data was only available for two years, for example. For the data we 
have, the level of tax paid is very volatile, appearing to be strongly 
influenced by the type of financing, as well as the particular year. In 
part, this can be explained by very small sample sizes, for the reasons 
described above. It is also the case, however, that the tax paid in any 
given year can vary enormously for reasons unconnected with the 
success of the firm, its willingness to pay tax, or the efforts of 
Swedfund. Tax holidays may be a feature, for example, or firms may 
invest heavily in a particular year, reducing profits and therefore tax 
paid.  
Despite these data issues, it is clear that Swedfund takes the issue 
of tax seriously. Firms with complex structures designed to 
artificially lower taxes due are screened out at the due diligence 
phase, and Swedfund strongly encourages all investees to pay their 
fair share of tax. Its annual survey requests taxes paid are reported 
on a country-by-country basis, which is important. Multinational 
firms report taxes on a consolidated, global basis, making it 
impossible to know how much tax has been paid in each country, 
and how this compares to what should have been paid given profits 
made in these countries. Campaigners on tax have long pressed the 
case for country-by-country reporting, and Swedfund is to be 
commended for taking this important step.   
On ESG issues, Swedfund undertakes an annual survey of 
investees. In 2014 this had 132 questions some of which related to 
outcomes (e.g. levels of C02 emissions), with the remainder 
concerning processes and guidelines (e.g. adherence to ILO 
guidelines). As discussed above, ESG indicators have changed 
considerable over time. To ensure comparability and a focus on core 
issues we constructed an ESG index based on 30 questions, enabling 
us to assign a comparable ESG ‘score’ to investees.  
At the portfolio level, we find no change in ESG performance. 
As we only have two years of data, this is not really surprising. 
Disaggregating the portfolio, we find loans perform better than 
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equities, both in terms of the total ‘score’ and the improvement seen 
over the period. Regionally, African investments perform worst on 
ESG issues, with Latin American investments having the highest 
scores, and Asian and European investments in the middle.  
Interestingly, older investments perform better than newer ones, 
suggesting that Swedfund may be positively influencing its investees 
over time. We also find a potential relationship between investment 
size and positive ESG outcomes. This may be partly explained by 
the fact that larger firms have more resources that they can devote 
to these issues, but also that Swedfund is able to exert greater 
influence when its investment is larger. As with all the ex post results 
reported here, however, the data issues described mean that these 
are indicative results rather than definitive findings.  
Given the data and sample size issues that have been discussed, 
we cannot say more than this. It is possible that Swedfund’s impact 
is much larger or smaller than it appears. We simply do not know. 
This raises two important questions: First, how could Swedfund 
significantly increase its poverty impacts? Second, how could this be 
robustly measured and used to improve impacts over time? 
For the first question, Swedfund faces a trade-off. Its potential 
for impact will be greatest in countries, regions and sectors where 
the need for investment is greatest. While potential impacts are 
greatest, the ability to realise these will be influenced by factors such 
as institutional quality and the investment climate. Risks are also 
likely to be higher. As document in this study, Swedfund faces 
significant financial risks, with losses often concentrated in a few 
investments. The increase in the proportion of loans in the portfolio 
that we have seen is one response to this. Another response would 
be to invest in lower risk ventures, but this would undermine the 
impacts that Swedfund is trying to achieve, as well as calling into 
question the extent to which its investments are financially 
additional. 
We suggest two positive ways that this could be addressed. First, 
the focus on higher-risk, more potentially impactful investments 
could be accelerated, with an acceptance that losses will be higher 
and Swedfund may not be able to operate on a financially self-
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sufficient basis. This would require regular injections of capital from 
the Government, but could be justified on the basis of impact. 
Second, Swedfund’s financial self-sufficiency could be maintained if 
risks were mitigated through greater diversification. This would 
require Swedfund to be larger than is currently the case, however. 
Again, this would require a capital injection from government, but 
this would be a one-off designed to enable Swedfund to reach a 
sustainable size such that risks could be well diversified. In both 
cases, increasing efforts to improve the investment climate in focus 
countries would be an important complement to investments. 
Rather than trying to do this directly, partnering closely with other 
development actors with more expertise and leverage on these 
issues would make sense.  
Both options require additional capital. To justify this, Swedfund 
would need to increase its impacts, and demonstrate that it is doing 
so. This brings us back to the second question posed above: how 
can impact be robustly measured, and what mechanisms can best 
drive increasing impact over time?  
If Swedfund grows its portfolio, this would help to address the 
issue of sample size. Swedfund, as with all DFIs, tracks a large and 
varied set of indicators. This is problematic for two reasons. First, 
key indicators are not differentiated from less important ones, 
potentially ‘drowning them out’. Second, a large set of indicators 
makes it difficult to ensure that some do not contradict each other. 
Rather than measure ever more things, a better approach would 
establish which impacts are most important, and then choose the 
minimum number of indicators to accurately capture these.  
Indicators should be also designed such that meaning cannot be 
obscured or misinterpreted. For example, tax questions should elicit 
clearly how much tax is paid in each jurisdiction as a share of profits 
in a meaningful way. There is little point collecting data if this is not 
the case. Robust evaluation also requires comparable indicators to 
be used over lengthy periods of time. A final point is data coverage. 
Response rates to Swedfund’s annual survey are very poor in some 
areas. One solution could be to make this part of the contractual 
obligations of investee firms.  
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As well as these ex post measures, we also recommend that 
Swedfund develop a stronger ex ante framework to enhance 
potential impacts. In this study, we review the literature on areas 
where Swedfund could potentially create additional impact. As well 
as country and sector choice, these include project selection and 
management impact. In time a framework of this kind should be 
informed by Swedfund’s ex post impacts, where these results inform 
choices such as sector or project selection, or the best way to engage 
with investees to maximise impact over time.  
To summarise, our recommendations are that: 
• Swedfund’s focus on low-income countries and the sectors 
with the greatest potential development impact within 
these countries is strengthened. 
• To address the increase in investment risk this would 
create we propose two options: 
i. Swedfund becomes a more specialist DFI focusing on 
high-risk/high-impact investments, but accepts that 
this will increase losses in the portfolio, and require 
regular capital injections from government to support 
this. 
ii. Swedfund expands and develops a more diversified 
portfolio to mitigate risk. This would enable the focus 
on high-risk/impact investments to continue within 
the context of a more diversified portfolio. While this 
would make it possible retain financial self-sufficiency, 
it would require a large, one-off capital injection.  
• As the ability to realise potential will be affected by the 
investment climate in different countries, Swedfund should 
coordinate with development actors focused on these 
issues. 
• Swedfund should focus on a small number of core impact 
objectives, and design as few indicators as possible to track 
these impacts.  
• A framework should be developed to select investments 
with the greatest potential impacts. 
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• Indicators should be designed to be unambiguous and 
meaningful.  
• Baselines should be taken at the point of investment, and a 
core of impact indicators gathered consistently over the life 
of the investment, with investee companies required to 
respond.  
• More consideration should be given to following up with 
exited investment.   
• Appropriate evaluation methods are used. Generally, these 
should be a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
with issues such as causality and attribution given full 
weight.  
• The results of ex post impact assessments should be used 
to inform sector & project selection and so drive a 
dynamic improvement in development impact over time.  
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1. Introduction 
Development Finance Institutions (DFI) are bilateral and 
multilateral agencies which invest in firms in developing countries 
to promote private sector development. They have become 
increasingly important development actors, and this trend looks 
certain to continue. While total Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) has been flat in real terms since 1990, DFIs’ investments 
have grown steadily at around 5 percent per year. In 2014, net ODA 
to developing countries was USD140bn, while DFI commitments 
had reached USD65bn (EDFI, 2016). At the same time, an 
increasing quantity of ODA finance is being used to support private 
sector development efforts, either as technical assistance (TA) 
grants to complement DFI investments, or as ‘blended finance’ 
where grant finance is directly combined with commercial 
investment. European bilateral DFIs represent around a half of 
global DFI flows, exceeding USD33bn in 2015, having tripled in 
size over the previous ten years. If these trends continue, DFI 
investments may ultimately reach parity with ODA (ibid.). 
An important question to ask is why? There are two sorts of 
answers to this question. First, a positive case can be made for 
investment to support private sector development (PSD) in general, 
and DFIs in particular. Most people accept that the primary route 
out of poverty is employment, and 90 percent of new jobs in low- 
and middle-income countries are created by the private sector (IFC, 
2013). From this perspective, therefore, the best way to reduce 
poverty is through creating private sector jobs. For these impacts to 
grow sustainably, companies need to be commercially viable. 
Fostering successful companies, is thus a legitimate and central 
objective of DFIs.  
As well as incomes, entrepreneurial opportunities, and the 
infrastructure upon which economic and social systems rely, the 
private sector is the main provider of the goods & services (G&S) 
people need and want (Avis, 2016). Increasing their ability to supply 
high quality G&S at an affordable price is another important goal of 
DFIs. It is therefore impossible to imagine the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) being achieved in any country that 
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does not have a vibrant and inclusive private sector. By supporting 
the creation and expansion of competitive firms, DFIs are at the 
heart of this effort.  
The second type of answer is more negative. On the one hand, 
there is less faith that ODA can achieve its desired goals, and it is 
even seen as an obstacle to development by some. Moving away 
from grant financing is in line with this. At the same time, many 
donors remain under pressure to cut spending, with fiscal deficits 
stubbornly high a decade after the global financial crisis. Grant 
financing is not repaid. Investments, in contrast, can be recouped, 
recycled and reused. As well as obvious value-for-money attractions, 
this is likely to appeal to those looking for areas of government 
spending to cut.  
Given reduced confidence in the ability of ODA to deliver, 
irrespective of how justified this is, a similar shift with respect to 
DFIs could be fatal for the whole idea of international development 
cooperation. For anyone concerned with achieving the SDGs, it is 
very important that DFIs succeed.  
This paper explores these issues through the lens of one 
particular DFI: Swedfund. All DFIs are different of course, but the 
challenges and opportunities that Swedfund faces are similar to 
those faced by comparable institutions. It is therefore hoped that 
this study is of wider interest in the DFI community.  
As we shall see, the balance of evidence suggests that Swedfund 
is having a positive impact on poverty, primarily through the supply 
of additional finance in capital-scarce countries, and through its 
ability to positively influence investee firms on ESG issues. We find 
little impact in other areas, but because of data limitations it is 
impossible to say whether this is because there is no impact, or 
whether we are just not able to detect it.   
To address this, we make clear recommendations on indicators, 
data collection, and methodology, and propose the adoption of an 
ex-ante framework (designed to select, structure and manage 
investments such that potential development impacts are 
maximised) and ex post framework (designed to robustly measure 
the extent to which these potential impacts are achieved).  
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We also address an important structural question, and argue that 
Swedfund’s impact will be greater if it strengthens and accelerates 
its focus on low-income countries, and on investments with the 
greatest potential development impacts within these countries. This 
would inevitably increase the risks that Swedfund faces, leading to 
more losses across the portfolio. One solution, would be to accept 
that more impact requires more risk, and that Swedfund may 
therefore face periodic losses, and require regular capital injections 
to balance its budget.  
The second option would be to increase the capital base, enabling 
Swedfund to diversify risk across a larger portfolio. This would also 
require a capital injection, potentially a significant one, but a larger, 
more diversified Swedfund would be more likely to be able to 
operate on a self-sufficient basis. This could therefore be a one-off 
injection of capital.  
Our findings suggest that Swedfund may be able to exert greater 
influence in areas such as ESG when its stake in the company is 
larger. An expanded portfolio would therefore also give Swedfund 
greater potential to positively influence firm behaviour. 
To justify either forms of additional public funding, a more 
systematic approach to maximising development impacts, and to 
measuring and demonstrating these impacts, would be required.   
The next section gives some background on DFIs in general and 
Swedfund in particular, while part 3 describes our approach to the 
evaluation. Parts 4 and 5 present ex-ante and ex-post findings on 
Swedfund’s impact, following which part 6 proposes an ex-ante 
framework to systematically enhance future impacts. The final 
section of the paper makes recommendations and concludes.  
 
       
24 
2. Background 
 Development Finance Institutions 
As described above, DFIs have become increasingly important 
development actors. They are agencies which provide financial 
support for firms in developing countries, with the aim of 
contributing to private sector development (PSD). DFIs generally 
provide a mix of equity and loans, and some also provide guarantees. 
In addition, many DFIs provide technical assistance in the form of 
advice of training to support their investments. Most bilateral DFIs 
are wholly publicly owned, 1  but some mix public and private 
ownership.2 The Swiss DFI (SIFEM) is privately owned. The IFC is 
the primary multilateral DFI, and is owned by national government 
stakeholders (te Velde, 2011). 
Within the shared parameters of promoting PSD, DFIs have 
slightly different mandates. This may be some combination of: 
supporting or promoting financially sustainable firms; attracting 
private co-investment; increasing the private investment through 
demonstration effects; maximising the development impacts of 
their investments (ibid.). Some DFIs are required to be financially 
autonomous, funding their activities through their own revenues, 
while others may receive regular or periodic capital injections from 
the state. DFIs operate in low- and to a lesser extent, middle-income 
countries. Some explicitly target low-income countries, as well as 
‘frontier markets’. 
2.1.1 DFIs and development impact 
Essentially, there are three models of development impact 
assessment. The first is based on the Good Practice Standards 
                                                 
1 CDC (UK); DEG (Germany); Swedfund (Sweden); Norfund (Norway); OPIC 
(US).  
2 PROPARCO (France); FMO (Netherlands); COFIDES (Spain); SIMEST 
(Italy).  
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(GPS), developed by the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG)3 
and influenced by the IFC (Sinha, Bortes and Grettve, 2010). The 
ECG and the GPS were established in 1996 ‘to promote a more 
harmonized approach to evaluation methodology’ among MDBs 
(ECG, 2014). 
The second model is based on the German Investment 
Corporation’s (DEG) Corporate Policy Project Rating (GPR). This 
was launched in 2000 and has been adopted by 15 DFIs4 other than 
DEG (Dalberg, 2010; Sinha, Bortes and Grettve, 2010; Kingombe, 
Massa and te Velde, 2011; DEG, 2013). 
Remaining approaches are generally hybrids of the frameworks 
above, but with features of particular importance to national DFIs 
added or extended. Such bespoke approaches have been developed 
and implemented by Swedfund, the CDC, and FMO (Sinha, Bortes 
and Grettve, 2010). 
While these approaches have important differences – the 
indicators they use to track outcomes, for example – there are also 
similarities. First, they generally capture outcomes in the same four 
areas: i) financial performance (e.g. the company’s profitability, the 
return to the DFI (internal rate of return – IRR)); ii) economic 
performance  (e.g. taxes paid, number of jobs created), iii) 
environmental and social performance (e.g. CO2 emissions, low-
income homes financed), and iv) PSD (with various indicators 
relating inter alia to demonstration effects, corporate governance, 
investment climate, and linkages) (Bracking and Ganho, 2011; 
Kingombe, Massa and te Velde, 2011). Second, most use both ex-
                                                 
3 The members of the ECG are: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (ERBD), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the 
Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), the Multilateral Investment Fund 
(MIF; a part of the IADB group), the IFC and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 
4 They include: AECID (Spain), Bio and SBI-BMI (Belgium), COFIDES 
(Spain), Norfund (Norway: but only for monitoring and evaluation), OeEB 
(Austria), Proparco (France), SIFEM (Switzerland) (Bracking and Ganho, 2011, 
p. 17) (Gössinger and Raza, 2011, p. 22; p. 25) (EU, 2013, p. 42). 
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ante and ex-post assessments, and mix qualitative and quantitative 
methods (Kingombe, Massa and te Velde, 2011). 
Overall, therefore, DFIs approach impact in similar ways 
(Lemma, 2015). Possible projects are assessed according to potential 
development impact using sector or project-related indicators. 
These ex-ante assessments are typically based on available documents 
and discussions with clients.5 Some DFI project managers (e.g. from 
DEG) also conduct onsite visits, which can inform qualitative 
assessments (e.g. on social benefits, or market effects) (DEG, 2013). 
Third-party data such as government statistics or international 
databases are also used, but to lesser extent, at least within the IFC 
(IEG, 2013). Ex-post assessments are conducted during and at the 
end of projects, with performance evaluated on the same indicators 
as those used in the initial appraisal (DEG, 2013; EU, 2013; Lemma, 
2015).  
Indicators used depend on the economic sector (e.g. agriculture, 
manufacturing) as well as the DFIs’ own preferences. According to 
an EU report, these reflect ‘their respective mandates and 
idiosyncrasies’ (2013: 32). Despite these differences, various sector-
specific and common indicators have been, and continue to be, 
developed by DFIs. 6  Twenty-five DFIs, including FMO, CDC, 
Swedfund and the IFC, agreed in 2013 to harmonise the indicators 
they use to assess development impacts, including using specific 
indicators by sector. Of the 27 core indicators developed, 15 are 
aligned with the Impact Reporting and Investment Standards 
(IRIS).7  
Regarding DFI tracking of development indicators within this 
framework, the Harmonized Indicators for Private Sector 
Operations (HIPSO) website states that DFIs ‘will use the 
harmonized definitions and units of measurement’, and that ‘if it has 
                                                 
5 Quantitative data (e.g. jobs, exports) can usually be taken from annual financial 
statements and/or business and other reports (DEG, 2013; IEG, 2013).   
6 These typically include the number of beneficiaries living below the poverty 
line (whose living conditions are improved by the project); jobs 
created/sustained; tax generated and contributed to the government (Sinha, 
Bortes and Grettve, 2010; EU, 2013). 
7 More information on these indicators can be found here: 
https://indicators.ifipartnership.org/indicators/.  
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a results tracking system in place that already features indicators that 
are the same as the harmonized ones, it will replace them 
accordingly’ (HIPSO, 2015). Despite this, it remains quite unclear 
to what extent DFIs have actually incorporated the HIPSO into 
their development assessment frameworks. For Lemma (2015) the 
limited detail provided on investment impacts by DFIs (apart from 
indicators such as employment and tax contributions) makes the 
assessment of the comparability of indicators across DFIs difficult. 
It seems clear that DFIs do not lack indicators: the most recent 
taxonomy presented by IRIS contains over 500 base indicators. 
What is less clear is that these indicators are accurately capturing the 
most important development impacts being created by DFIs, or that 
they are internally consistent. From an environmental perspective, 
for example, a DFI may measure Co2 emissions, which growth 
being seen negatively. At the same time, they may positively assess 
an increase in sales and financial performance, despite it being this 
which led to emissions growth. These are difficult questions, but 
they will not be resolved by simply counting more things.  
2.1.2 Project Rating  
Decisions to fund projects are based on a combination of projected 
financial returns and development impacts, established with 
baselines and targets, and estimated by project officers or managers 
using the documentation and data at hand (Gössinger and Raza, 
2011). Based on these indicators and ‘an informed judgment by the 
evaluator’ (ECG, n.d., p. 10), project officers or managers typically 
give the projects a rating. The GPR, for example, assesses projects 
with a rating out of 500, while until 2014 the FMO used a scorecard 
to rate projects on a scale of 99 (Carnegie Consult and ODI, 2014).  
Issues have arisen over the way that DFIs rate projects. One 
study found FMO staff focused too much on ‘financial aspects’, for 
example (Gössinger and Raza, 2011: 33). Again with respect to 
FMO, another concluded that: ‘a lot relies on the knowledge of IOs 
[investment officers] and IMTs (rather than detailed modelling 
studies) and some complete an EDIS scorecard in just a few hours 
and sometimes after the project has progressed to CIP [Clearance 
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in Principle] stage, casting doubt on the use of EDIS as a steering 
tool.’ (Carnegie Consult and ODI, 2014: 43-4). This brought them 
to the conclusion that an EDIS score ‘did not appear to be used 
convincingly as a steering tool’ (ibid: 44). 
In a review of DFIs in the infrastructure sector, Spratt and Ryan-
Collins (2012) find, similarly to Gössinger and Raza, op cit), that 
DFIs may overweight potential financial returns relative to other 
objectives. They find that this is more likely to be the case when 
DFI officer’s incentives are closely aligned with the financial 
performance of investments, and more broadly, where DFIs are 
required to be financially independent.  
The GPR has also been criticised on a number of counts. First, 
‘highly complex concepts’ such as ‘gender and social effects [of 
investments]’ are very difficult to define, let alone measure 
accurately. As a result, ‘it is impossible to define on a general basis 
whether a project is “worth” 0 points, 15 points or something in 
between’ (Gössinger and Raza, 2011: 33). Second, the way that 
points are weighted in the GPR means that the ‘development 
effects/sustainability’ of projects (which is essentially the raison 
d’être of DFIs) can only account for half of the rating at most, and 
a project can receive a rating of just 50/150 on this measure and still 
be approved if it scores well elsewhere (ibid). Given that 15 other 
DFIs also use the GPR, these are important issues.  
A more general problem, as discussed above, is the very large 
number of indicators now commonly used by DFIs, with little or 
no attempt to weight these in terms of importance. In these 
circumstances, the importance that can be attached to any single 
indicator, or group of indicators, must be less than if fewer indicators 
were used. But if some indicators are more important than others 
from a development perspective, and this must surely be the case, 
then the most important indicators will not be given the prominence 
that they should. In effect, they will be ‘drowned out’ by the plethora 
of indicators. Part of the problem may be that, when new indicators 
are developed and accepted as important, they tend to be added to 
what was already there, rather than replacing others now deemed 
less important. Over time, therefore, multiplication – and dilution – 
is inevitable.  
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2.1.3  Asset Allocation 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of DFI sector allocations from a few 
years ago. This will certainly have changed now, significantly so in 
some cases, but it remains helpful in illustrating the variety of 
approaches taken by DFIs to asset allocation, which persists. At the 
most extreme, there are sector focused institutions such as the 
Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG). Others, such 
as OPIC are heavily weighted towards a small number of sectors. In 
OPIC’s case, this is finance and infrastructure, where 57 and 27 
percent respectively of the portfolio is invested. SIMEST (Spain), in 
contrast, devoted a very small amount to finance, but 78 percent of 
the portfolio to industry and manufacturing. Other DFIs (CDC and 
FMO) were more diversified. A first way of distinguishing between 
DFIs is thus their degree of diversification or concentration across 
sectors.  
Even the most diversified DFIs are not evenly weighted across 
sectors, suggesting prioritisation. This raises the question of the 
criteria that DFIs are using to allocate their assets by sector? One 
relevant feature that is not seen in Table 1, is the fact that bilateral 
and multilateral DFIs are increasingly investing in the financial 
sector (Kwakkenbos, 2012). The World Bank Group, for example, 
committed a third of its portfolio to the financial sector between 
2009 and 2013, more than half of its portfolio if short-term trade 
finance is included (Chowla and Kenner, 2014). 
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Table 1: DFI Sector allocations 2009 
Note: Others e.g. include: Global Financial Markets; Global Manufacturing & Services; Health 
& Education; Oil, Gas, Mining & Chemicals; Sub-National Finance; Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT); etc. (i) In the case of CDC, the underlying portfolio ‘other’ 
sector category e.g. includes: Health Care 8%; Mining 6%; Others 6%. (ii) Loan and grants 
approval by sector in 2009. (iii) Loans. (*) Multi-sector. (**) PIDG is focused solely on 
infrastructure development, which sets it apart from many other donor -funded initiatives. 
Source: Kingombe et al. (2011)  
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 Bilaterals  
BIO  45%  20%  5%  30%  N/A  93  
CDC  23%  34%  6%  18%  19% (i)  794  
COFIDES  1%  45%  5%  47%  3%  117  
DEG  35%  19%  13%  27%  6%  670  
Finnfund  19%  28%  1%  44%  7%  129  
FMO  42%  24%  3%  30%  2%  904  
IFU/IØ/IFV  5%  10%  15%  63%  8%  307  
Norfund  23%  55%  5%  11%  5%  83  
OeEB  100%  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  14  
Proparco  45%  36%  4%  12%  2%  354  
SBI  21%  13%  18%  47%  0%  24  
SIFEM  18%  3%  N/A  79%  N/A  63  
SIMEST  2%  8%  8%  78%  4%  341  
SOFID  N/A  N/A  N/A  100%  N/A  3  
SwedFund  8%  22%  1%  64%  5%  72  
OPIC 57% 27%  
 Multilaterals (commitments in 2009)  
PIDG  100%**  
AfDB (ii) 10.8% 52.1%   7%  29.1%*  
ADB (iii)  3.9%  39.9%  3.4%  0.8%  52%   
EBRD  36%  37%  8%  18%  N/A  327  
EIB  2%  65%  10%  23%  N/A  N/A  
IFC  48%  25%  2%  25%  N/A  567  
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2.1.4 Evidence on asset allocation and impact 
DFIs aim to achieve development impact in broadly similar ways – 
i.e. by fostering PSD which creates employment and incomes, 
provides goods & services, drives local and national economic 
development, and generates tax revenues for government. Clearly, 
potential impacts will be larger in some situations than others: asset 
allocation matters for development impact. First, there is the 
country in which DFIs invest, and second, the sectors prioritised 
within these countries. On the first of these, potential impacts will 
be greatest in countries where the need is greatest – i.e. where 
poverty is highest – and where the private sector is least developed 
and therefore has the greatest potential to contribute to this. While 
this is true in terms of potential impact, it should also be noted that 
this potential is more likely to be realised in some circumstances 
than others, particularly where an institutional framework that is 
broadly supportive of PSD exists. On the second factor, some 
sectors will generate more jobs, provide more valuable G&S, or 
contribute more to inclusive growth.  
A third consideration is accrued experience. Sinha et al. (2010) 
suggest that DFIs may choose to focus their investments in 
particular sectors because of their expertise in these areas, and 
because other DFIs may already be focusing their activities in other 
sectors. Intuitively it seems plausible that focusing on fewer sectors 
may have advantages, enabling DFIs to generate sector specific 
know-how, provide better services and manage investment risks in 
these sectors better (Gössinger and Raza, 2011). 
It is not clear from the literature or DFI documents to what 
extent this third consideration drives decisions on asset allocations. 
More broadly, it is not always clear what considerations do drive 
these decisions. As discussed above, some sectors are likely to have 
greater potential development impact than others. What does the 
literature tell us in this regard? 
After reviewing the literature on the contributions of various 
sectors to development, Sinha et al. (2010) argue that DFIs should 
focus on investments in agriculture, where development impacts are 
likely to be very high in lower-income countries. Such investments 
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are seen as overly risky, however, and many bilateral and multilateral 
DFIs (i.e. FMO, IFC and EBRD) have turned away and/or reduced 
their portfolios in these areas because of poor returns (ibid.). 
As well as broad-based impacts, some sectors have high potential 
with respect to poverty. In this regard, Loayza and Raddatz (2010) 
argue that more labour intensive sectors (in relation to their size) 
tend to have stronger effects on poverty alleviation. Based on this 
logic they find that ‘agriculture is the most poverty-reducing sector, 
followed by construction, and manufacturing; while mining, utilities, 
and services by themselves do not seem to help poverty reduction’ 
(p. 148). 
A number of studies have looked at the employment potential of 
different sectors. For example, Basnett and Sen (2013) find that 
manufacturing, services, textiles and leather, and agri-business and 
agro-processing contribute most to employment. 
Another key form of impact – and important objective of DFIs 
– is the promotion of growth, particularly ‘pro-poor’, or ‘inclusive’ 
growth. Massa (2011) finds that infrastructure and agriculture both 
contribute the most to growth specifically, Osmani (2002, cited in 
Byiers et al., 2015) suggests that the pro-poorness of growth 
depends on three features: 
• ‘the sectoral composition of output and whether it is 
concentrated in more labour-intensive sectors, where the 
poor tend to work; 
• the extent to which more labour-intensive techniques are 
used, and the extent to which there are discernible shifts in 
the structure of employment towards high-productivity 
sectors; 
• the evolution of real wages and earnings more generally, 
and the extent to which the internal and external terms of 
trade improve for the labour-intensive sector’. 
These findings stress the importance of labour-intensiveness of 
sectors of the economy (which is particularly relevant in developing 
countries), providing support for DFIs that focus on this issue.  
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One DFI that is explicit about its asset allocation strategy in this 
regard is CDC, where sectors are targeted on the basis of their 
propensity to ‘generate employment’ (CDC, 2012:1). This 
propensity estimated with ‘country-level input/output tables 
aggregated and averaged at the low income country level’ (Carnegie 
Consult and ODI, 2014: 113). While this is to be commended, its 
value is weakened by the fact that average sector employment scores 
are used across developing countries. Estimating direct and indirect 
employment effects of investments is a very location- and sector-
specific task. The crucial factors are the proportion of domestic 
involvement in supply chains, which varies widely between sectors 
in the same country, but also the same sectors in different countries. 
CDC accepts this but argues that poor data availability at the 
country-level prevents a more detailed analysis (Carnegie Consult 
and ODI, 2014).  
As described above, DFIs have significantly increased their 
financial sector investments. This is justified on the basis that 
channelling funding through intermediaries (including banks, funds 
and financial service companies) they can better serve micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), while also reducing 
transaction costs (Romero and Van de Poel (2014). Despite the 
increasing focus of DFIs, there is little evidence that investments in 
finance are particular important in terms of development impact, 
beyond the general finding that financial sector development is 
positively correlated with growth (Arcand et al, 2012). Another 
issue, as pointed out by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group, is that it is virtually impossible to track the development 
impacts of investments channelled through financial institutions, 
making it very difficult to substantiate claims of impact (IEG, 2013). 
While the development potential of financial sector investment 
is unproven, the evidence suggests that the extractives sector 
investments offer little in the way of employment potential, or 
forward and backward linkages to the rest of the economy (Szirmai 
et al., 2013). Although some sectors will have more impact potential, 
both generally and with respect to particular outcomes, Lin and 
Monga (2010) stress the need to focus on sectors which may hold a 
latent comparative advantage in particular countries. If firms enter 
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such sectors, ‘[t]hese firms will claim largest possible market shares 
and create the greatest possible economic surplus in the form of 
profits and salaries’ (Lin and Monga, 2010: 4).8 For developing and 
low-income countries in particular, which typically have abundant 
labour or natural resources and scarce capital, their comparative 
advantage will be in labour-intensive or resource-intensive 
industries (Lin and Monga, 2010; Campbell and Ahmed, 2012). 
Kingombe et al. (2011) support the idea of focusing on sectors 
where countries have a potential competitive advantage, particularly 
where these also have a large positive effect on growth and poverty. 
To summarise, asset allocation is likely to have the greatest 
positive impact on development outcomes when the following three 
conditions are met: 
i) Investments are focused in low-income countries, and in 
the poorest regions of these countries. 
ii) Investments are focused in sectors with the greatest 
potential development impact in areas such as poverty 
reduction, employment and pro-poor growth. The unique 
circumstance of different countries means that it is not 
possible to specify sectors (and sub-sectors) that will 
always have the greatest development impact. That said, a 
thorough review of the literature suggests that, in the 
aggregate, the following ranking of sectors is a reasonable 
position from which to start: 1) agriculture; 2) 
manufacturing (especially food processing and light 
industry such as textiles); 3) infrastructure/ 
                                                 
8 The authors propose a six-stage methodology for identifying the most pro-
mising sectors, which includes issues such as: factor endowments, the historical 
experience of similar countries, and the use of tools such as the ‘growth 
diagnostics’ framework to identify location-specific obstacles to growth. The 
approach is endorsed in the IFC Jobs Study (2013), which argues that ‘[w]hile 
industry-specific efforts could be effective, they require very careful diagnostics 
on country-specific competitive advantages and growth barriers’ (p. 53). 
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construction/energy; 4) services (including retail, 
hospitality, tourism); 5) the financial sector; 6) extractives.9 
iii) Investments are focused in sectors where countries have 
the greatest potential competitive advantage going forward.  
 Swedfund 
2.2.1 Ownership, governance and funding  
Swedfund was established in 1979 under the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In 2014, ownership of Swedfund changed to the Ministry of 
Finance, and switched again to the Ministry of Enterprise and 
Innovation in 2015 (Swedfund, 2015). While the Ministry of 
Enterprise and Innovation has full ownership, the Foreign Ministry 
retains responsibility for ‘relevant issues, development policies and 
state supported export credits’ (Swedfund, 2014). Swedfund’s 
board, consisting of eight members, is nominated by the Ministry of 
Enterprise and Innovation.  
Kwakkenbos (2012) reports that Sweden increased the use of its 
ODA towards private sector development seven times between 
2006 and 2012. Eurodad estimates that about 2 percent of direct 
bilateral assistance is drawn from aid budgets, the majority of which 
is channelled through DFIs (same as for the Netherlands and 
Norway) (Kwakkenbos, 2012). Finally, Swedfund received €133 
million in increased capital between 2012 and 2015, representing a 
62 percent increase. Following a 2015 shift to renewables within the 
energy portfolio, Swedfund received a further capital injection of 
SEK 400 million in 2016 from the Swedish government for the 
purpose of “promoting investments in sustainable solutions for the 
environment and climate that will lead to a switch to renewable 
energy” (Swedfund, 2016). From 2017, only renewable energy 
investments are permitted. In November 2016 Swedfund also 
                                                 
9 Water and Sanitation, health and education are not included in the ranking 
since little assessment of their development impacts within the context of DFI 
investments has been undertaken.  
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received confirmation of an additional SEK 400 million for the 2017 
financial year.10 
2.2.2 Mandate and high-level objectives 
Swedfund’s mandate and objectives are to: 
Contribute to the goal of Sweden’s Policy for Global Development (PGD) 
concerning equitable and sustainable global development. The objective for the 
company’s activities is the same as the objective for Swedfund’s international aid 
– to contribute to creating the conditions for improved living standards for people 
living in poverty and facing repression. The starting point for Swedish aid is the 
poor and repressed individual’s needs and circumstances. Swedish aid shall 
endeavour to achieve long-term and concrete results in the fight against poverty 
and contribute to economic, social and environmentally sustainable development’ 
(Swedfund, 2015: 95). 
Derived from its mandate, Swedfund has four strategic sustainability 
goals, which were adopted in 2013 (Swedfund, 2014): 
i) Impact on society, where ‘Swedfund shall contribute to the 
creation of jobs with a good working environment and 
good employment terms.’ 
ii) Sustainability, where ‘Swedfund shall contribute to the 
creation of long-term sustainable companies in the world’s 
poorest countries.’ 
iii) Financial viability, where ‘Swedfund shall contribute to the 
creation of sustainable and financially viable companies 
located in the world’s poorest countries.’ 
iv) Anti-corruption, where ‘Swedfund shall make proactive 
efforts to tackle corruption internally and within portfolio 
companies.’ 
                                                 
10 Source: personal communication with Swedfund staff 
  
 
37 
 
2.2.3 Investment approach, rationale and 
financial returns 
Swedfund generally invests for between 7 and 10 years (Swedfund, 
2015). It does not usually take an ownership stake in a company 
above 30 percent, though this can be exceeded if circumstances 
justify this. As a result, it generally co-invests with other partners. 
These can be private investors, or other DFIs, particularly European 
DFIs and the IFC (Swedfund, 2015: 21). Swedfund also provides 
concessional loans to small and medium-sized Swedish companies 
through a mechanism called ‘Swedpartnerships’, which aims to 
facilitate the creation of sustainable and viable companies in the 
investee region. Swedfund is also engaged with larger Swedish firms. 
For example, a partnership has been agreed with Scania concerning 
a biogas plant in India and with H&M on fostering a sustainable 
Ethiopian textile industry (Swedfund 2016: 63). The nature of the 
H&M partnership is that “H&M will contribute with expertise and 
knowledge of the textile market as well as purchase products from suppliers that 
Swedfund will invest in. Swedfund will provide local market expertise and 
expansion investments in suppliers to H&M.” (H&M, 2014). These 
partnerships have been looked at positively for the most part. 
Although some critics have questioned the role of “state aid” to 
larger businesses, it should be noted that this criticism was levelled 
at Sida rather than Swedfund (SVD, 2017).  
While Swedfund has a quite diversified portfolio (see Table 1 
above) they have prioritised the following sectors: 
manufacturing/industry and services, financial institutions and 
energy, including renewables. In its 2014 annual report, Swedfund 
(2015: 11) provides rationales for investing in these sectors. 
Regarding the manufacturing/industry and services sector: ‘[t]his 
sector creates jobs that lead to inclusive economic growth’. For 
investments in financial institutions: ‘[g]reat need for financing for 
customers in the private sector where multiplier effects are created 
through sustainable business’. Finally, regarding energy: ‘[d]emand 
for electricity is much greater than supply, thereby restricting 
growth’; and ‘[a]ccess to electricity is key to development and 
reducing poverty, which is why Swedfund has chosen to invest 
specifically in the energy sector’ (Swedfund, 2015: 43).  
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While these choices may be reasonable, little evidence is 
presented to support them. At the same time, no reasons are given 
for why they invest little in sectors such as agriculture, which is 
somewhat surprising given Swedfund’s previous recognition that 
‘agriculture is one of the most important economic sectors and 
sources of employment in developing countries’ (Swedfund, 2010: 
17). 
The 2009 Sustainability Report does provide some rationale for 
their investment in the energy sector, i.e. previous experience with 
the sector, stating that ‘Swedfund has for many years been involved 
in investments in environmental/clean technology and energy and 
we focus on continuing and expanding these investments’ 
(Swedfund, 2010: 16). As of 2013-14, Swedfund invests to achieve 
impact on three pillars: impact on society; sustainability/ESG; and 
financial viability.  
Table 2 gives Swedfund’s estimated annual profit in SEK 
(negative figures in parentheses), and their percentage return on 
opening equity from 2005 to 2014. As we can see, modest annual 
gains in the first few years of the period gave way to a succession of 
annual losses after 2009. Losses were particularly large in 2012. 
Table 2. Swedfund financial performance 2005-2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annual profit after tax  
and provisions (SEK millions) 
Annual return on  
opening equity (%) 
2005 54 N/A 
2006 85 N/A 
2007 17 1.23 
2008 76 6.29 
2009 (3) -4.45 
2010 (64) -4.05 
2011 (45) -2.24 
2012 (224) -7.34 
2013 (93) -2.95 
2014 (63) -1.81 
Note:  Source: Swedfund (2015). Numbers within brackets are negative.  
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For Swedfund (2015) the main reason for its losses in recent years 
is write downs of several portfolio companies, driven by the fact 
that it is investing in a financially difficult countries and sectors.  
Table 3 provides more detail on returns on individual 
investments exited in 2014. This is instructive, as it illustrates how 
much variability is masked by the average figures in Table 2. As we 
can see, internal rates of return (IRR) on individual investments 
range from +22.4 to -26.9 percent.  
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Table 3. Swedfund investments exited in 2014 
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Nordrus Russia Hotels Shares 10 16.8 22.4 
Cimbenin Benin Cement 
prod. 
Shares 22.5 35.6 11.4 
Sacombank Vietnam Financial 
sector 
Loan 3 13.7 7.1 
Fors MW Estonia Forest 
machinery 
Shares 15.5 5.3 6.7 
BBSB Belarus Financial 
sector 
Loan 4.5 4.4 5.8 
Al Quesir Egypt Hotels Loan 10 8.7 5 
Prestando China Manufact. 
industry 
Shares 6 -12 0 
Recupero China Chemicals 
industry 
Shares 6 -2.2 0 
Swedmilk Mace-
donia 
Dairy Shares 
& Loan 
7 -6.2 0 
Askembla Baltic 
states 
Fund Shares 11 -23.9 -16 
Bhutan 
Dairy 
Bhutan Food  
industry 
Loan 9.5 -4 -19.6 
Artheon 
Battery 
India Battery 
prod. 
Shares 
& loan 
4 -16.8 -24.2 
Belstar India Microfin. Shares 4 -2.4 -26.9 
Source: Swedfund (2015) 
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2.2.4 Impact assessment 
As with other DFIs (see above) Swedfund conducts an ex-ante 
assessment process, which involves a detailed questionnaire and site 
visits to evaluate the potential impacts of each investment. If an 
investment is made, a separate annual questionnaire is sent, and 
further site visits may also be made where necessary to assess 
progress on ESG risks identified. This process has five stages11: 
 
1. Lead undertakes initial assessment of the country of 
operation, the strategic partner and the nature of 
Swedfund’s role. At this stage there is also a preliminary 
ESG screening where the proposal’s business plan is 
assessed, and the investment is tested against exclusion 
criteria.   
2. Initial assessment of the investment and meetings with the 
investment committee. Resources are allocated for due 
diligence and a first assessment of ESG risks is made. This 
forms the basis of a concept clearance note to the 
investment committee  
3. Extensive due diligence: focusing on the financial, 
commercial, ESG, integrity, development results and legal 
procedures. With regards to ESG, the questionnaire to the 
investee is introduced, focusing on E&S, corporate 
governance and anti-bribery and corruption. The ESG 
Manager prepares third party analysis if required. From 
there an investment case is presented to the investment 
committee. After approval, there is a preliminary 
discussion of the investment terms.   
4. Contract Negotiations: Continued discussions and 
negotiations regarding investment terms and ESG 
requirements, for which there may be some action required 
                                                 
11 Information regarding the investment process given during internal 
presentation from visit to Swedfund offices in December 2017.  
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by the investee with regards to ESG ahead of Investment 
approval.  
5. Investment approval and disbursement of funds. For 
board approval the ESG Manager summarises risks and 
proposes mitigating measures. The ESG Manager also 
writes an extensive analysis of Environmental and Social 
considerations (E&S) in a separate memo and creates an 
“ESGAP”, which is annexed to the contract. This 
describes specific actions for the company to take to meet 
its ESG obligations and is actively managed throughout the 
investment process. The fact that the ESGAP is part of the 
contract gives Swedfund significant leverage, as failure to 
comply would breach the terms of the contract, potentially 
threatening financial support.  
The IFI harmonised development results indicators for PSD, as well 
other relevant indicators, are selected at the time of investment, and 
tailored to each investment (Swedfund, 2015). Jobs created and 
taxes paid to government are tracked for all investments. They also 
assess the environmental, social and governance (ESG) impacts of 
investments, knowledge transfer and capacity building (Swedfund, 
2013), and financial viability (internal rate of return) (Swedfund, 
2015).12 Ex-ante indicators are then tracked through the investment 
cycle, and impacts captured ex-post.  
Overall, therefore, Swedfund measures what most DFIs 
measure. However, there is little mention of demonstration effects, 
or additionality as part of the assessment process, where the 2014 
report simply states that ‘[t]here are many positive results in the 
above analysis but there is a lot we can learn to make us even more 
effective. Clear goals, systematic follow-up and effective risk 
management in all pillars are therefore essential’ (Swedfund, 2015, 
p. 69). 
 
 
                                                 
12 This entails looking at historic and forecasted financial data, as well as regular 
quarterly reports, company visits, 100-days plans, etc. 
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3. Approach to evaluation and data 
availability  
This is not the first attempt to assess Swedfund’s development 
impact. Bracking and Ganho (2011) mention a review done by PwC 
(2009) which found that about half of Swedfund’s funds included 
investments which represented medium to high risk. 
In a review of previous Swedfund evaluations, Christian Aid13 
argues that: ‘There has been a lot of debate about whether 
investments through Swedfund really lead to poverty reduction and 
sustainable development. The system for follow-up has been quite 
weak … and it has been difficult to see clear development results’. 
The same report found that Swedfund has even been criticised for 
channelling funds through tax havens. In comments on an earlier 
draft of this study, Swedfund questioned the validity of Christian 
Aid’s findings, and also pointed to the significant improvements 
they have made with respect to taxation. The tax-related 
developments are discussed later in this evaluation.  
Sjö and Flygare (2008) found that Swedfund’s additionality was 
unclear, as a majority of investments would have gone ahead 
anyway. Overall, however, the evaluation found that Swedfund 
achieved its goals, though there was criticism for not following up 
with each companies it invests in, thus limiting the knowledge it can 
draw in terms of development results over the longer-term. 
 Approach to evaluation  
This evaluation addresses the question: Have the investments 
undertaken by Swedfund contributed to poverty reduction and, if 
so, to what extent and how? We define poverty broadly as 
‘pronounced deprivation of well-being’ (World Bank, 2000), and are 
therefore concerned with the determinants of well-being in a 
developing country context. As with all DFIs, a particular challenge 
                                                 
13 http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/Hidden-profits-tax-report-
November-2014.pdf 
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is that there is a long (and often indirect) causal chain from 
investments in companies and funds to the anticipated changes in 
poverty at a local or household level. 
It is therefore necessary to break down this chain into 
component parts. To achieve this, we proposed a theory-based 
evaluation (TBE) based on a causal chain that captures how 
Swedfund’s investments might lead (through company growth, 
employment and taxation) to an impact on poverty. This follows an 
approach advocated by Jackson (2013) for assessing the impact of 
investments, with evidence collected used to test assumptions and 
the extent to which the chain holds true. 
For the design of a TBE, we first consider the ‘theory’ behind 
the intervention to help explain how Swedfund investments are 
expected to lead to poverty reduction (both directly and through 
assumed trickle-down effects from overall economic growth). The 
boxes in Table 4 set out our understanding of the causal change 
from investment to impact. Each box describes one link in this 
chain, where an activity in the first column creates certain outputs, 
indicators for which are described in the second column. The most 
important assumptions that underpin these relationships are then 
described in the third column. 
The first ‘link’ in the chain is the investment by Swedfund, which 
enables economic activity to expand. The key assumption is that this 
investment is ‘additional’ – i.e. it would not have happened 
otherwise, and therefore the resultant activities can be attributed to 
Swedfund’s intervention. In ‘link’ 2 this increased economic activity 
leads to direct and indirect effects. Directly, jobs are created and 
new, better, or more affordable goods & services (G&S) are made 
available. The key assumptions here are that jobs are sustained over 
time, and that G&S are available locally. Indirectly, faster rates of 
local and national economic growth are anticipated, with the rates 
of growth dependent upon which sectors are invested in. Here the 
key assumption is that some sectors are more ‘transformative’ in 
terms of their growth potential than others. As well as these direct 
and indirect impacts, Swedfund’s investments may also create 
‘demonstration effects’, where examples of successful investments 
can attract private finance into similar locations and sectors.   
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Link 3 examines the impact of the direct and indirect effects 
described. Here we expect to see more and better employment 
leading to higher incomes and increased well-being. The 
assumptions are that jobs are sufficiently well paid and fulfilling to 
have positive well-being effects. The availability of new, better and 
cheaper G&S should see living standards rise if these are both 
affordable and useful.  
Faster local and national growth will have positive impacts on 
employment, incomes and G&S, but the strength of these effects 
will be determined by how ‘inclusive’ (or ‘pro-poor’) the processes 
of growth are. Finally, this expansion of economic activity should 
see tax revenues rise (locally and nationally), with the key 
assumption being that this process is performed efficiently.  
In Link 4, higher incomes create a multiplier effect, spurring a 
further expansion of economic activity, locally and nationally. Here 
the key assumption is that investments have occurred in 
transformative sectors creating strong spillover effects. Link 5 
describes the process through which higher local and national tax 
revenues lead to the provision of more/better public services, which 
is underpinned by the assumption that this happens effectively. In 
Link 6, the combination of higher incomes and improved public 
services leads to enhanced well-being, locally and nationally.  
In order to have the greatest ultimate impact on well-being, 
investments should be made in countries, and regions within 
countries, where need is greatest and so the greatest potential for 
improvements exist. To return to the original question motivating 
this research, these are likely to be countries and regions where 
poverty levels are highest. A final assumption underpinning this link, 
is that lower poverty and higher well-being lead to improvements in 
social cohesion, locally and nationally.  
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Table 4. Theory of Change 
Link 1. Swedfund (co)invests 
Causal chain Indicators  Underlying assumptions 
Investment Economic activity 
expands 
Would not have 
happened otherwise 
Link 2. The combination of Swedfund / company investment leads to…  
Causal chain Indicators  Underlying assumptions 
Increased economic 
activity 
Direct effects: 
- New jobs  
-New/better/ 
cheaper G&S 
- Jobs and incomes 
sustainable 
- G&S produced for local 
market 
Indirect effects: 
- Faster local growth 
- Faster nat. growth 
- Investments in 
transformative sectors, 
locally and nationally 
A ‘demonstration’ 
effect 
- Investment in 
sector increases 
(crowding-in) 
- Similar jobs & G&S 
increase (by other 
companies) 
- Risks in sector not too 
high to attract other 
investors (i.e. that 
investors perception of 
risks is inaccurately high) 
Link 3. The direct and indirect results described above lead to…  
Causal chain Indicators  Underlying assumptions 
New jobs are 
created 
- Incomes rise 
- Well-being 
increases 
- Wages are reasonable 
- Jobs are fulfilling 
- Jobs have a disproport. 
increased effect on 
household 
New, better, 
cheaper G&S 
- Living standards 
rise 
- G&S affordable and 
useful 
Faster local growth - Equitable growth 
in local jobs and 
G&S 
- Increased local tax 
revenues 
- Localised growth is 
‘inclusive’. 
- Local taxes collected 
efficiently 
Faster national 
growth 
- Equitable growth 
in national jobs and 
G&S 
- Increased national 
tax revenues 
- National growth is 
‘inclusive’ 
- National taxes collected 
efficiently 
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Link 4: These local and national effects lead to… 
Causal chain Indicators  Underlying assumptions 
Higher local 
incomes 
- Sustainable jobs 
created 
- Affordable G&S 
available 
- ‘transformative’ sectors 
create strong local 
spillovers 
Higher national 
incomes 
- Sustainable jobs 
created 
- Affordable G&S 
available 
- ‘transformative’ sectors 
create strong national 
spillovers 
Link 5: Increased tax revenues from higher incomes leads to…  
Causal chain Indicators  Underlying assumptions 
Increased provision 
local public services 
- New/improved 
local public services 
- Local resources used 
effectively 
Increased provision 
of national public 
services 
- New/improved 
national public 
services 
- National resources used 
effectively 
Link 6: Higher incomes and better provision of public services lead to… 
Causal chain Indicators Underlying assumptions 
Higher local well-
being 
- Fulfilling jobs 
created 
- Desirable G&S 
available 
- Improved human 
development 
outcomes 
- Direct local impacts 
described improve 
community 
cohesion/’social well-
being’. 
- Local potential to 
improve well-being as 
high as possible. 
Higher national 
well-being 
- Fulfilling jobs 
created 
- Desirable G&S 
available 
- Improved human 
development 
outcomes 
- Direct national impacts 
improve ‘national well-
being’/cohesion 
- National potential to 
improve well-being as 
high as possible.  
 
In carrying out the study however, the expectation was that the link 
from economic activity to taxes and public services to well-being - 
while obviously very important – occurs over too lengthy a time 
period to be included.  Furthermore, the data limitations (see section 
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below) meant that the analysis of links 3 to 6 was not possible, and 
the focus has been on a further breakdown of the causal chain from 
links 1 to 3. These are the more immediate (and more attributable) 
changes (e.g. job creation, improve ESG practices, etc.), and taken 
together provide an indication of the likely contribution of 
Swedfund to poverty impact. One exception is that we were able to 
assess the final assumption of link 6: i.e. that Swedfund’s 
investments are focused in areas where their potential impact is 
greatest. 
Swedfund invests through equity or loans into portfolio 
companies, or indirectly into these companies through equity funds. 
If successful, the effective mobilisation of this investment will lead 
to growing businesses measured in terms of revenue (an indicator 
of their overall growth), EBITDA (a measure of the quality of their 
growth, through profitability), and taxation. A growing company is 
expected to lead to direct and indirect job creation which has the 
potential to have an important effect on employees (and their 
household’s) income and well-being.  
Alongside these economic indicators, Swedfund undertakes an 
ESG screening, due diligence and monitoring processes (ESGAP) 
that aims to improve business practices (such as governance, 
worker’s rights, health and safety, gender, and environmental 
practices). Some of this will feed through to improved performance 
of the investment (e.g. management and governance), while others 
will affect the quality of jobs created (health and safety, training, 
facilities for women employees, etc.); or have an impact on 
incomes/well-being (minimum wages, employment of women, 
etc.), or enhance environmental effects (lower energy use, 
renewables, safe disposal of waste, etc.). The ESG data (discussed 
below) provides some evidence of these latter effects, though much 
of the data is focused on procedural changes (e.g. health and safety 
policy, systems for recording accidents, etc.) rather than changes in 
practice (e.g. lower instances of death or serious injury). Where 
possible, changes in practice are surfaced, otherwise we assume that 
a procedural change is a valid proxy of a change in company or 
employee behaviour, while acknowledging that this will not always 
be the case.  
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This provides a structure for the analysis in the following 
sections, which is organised into ex-ante and ex-post assessments of 
impacts. The ex-ante assessment tests some of the key assumptions 
described above, particularly that investments are focused in places 
and sectors where the potential development impacts are greatest. 
The ex-post assessment is organised according to the categories 
described here: (i) financial sustainability (revenue, EBITDA), 
employment (mainly direct job creation); and (ii) ESG (improved 
business practices). 
 Data availability  
Anonymised data was provided by Swedfund. Financial and ESG 
data were provided separately, because financial data comes through 
the reporting mechanism between investor and investee, whereas 
ESG information is the result of an annual environmental and 
sustainability questionnaire (which will be discussed in greater detail 
below). The data was anonymised by Swedfund to protect 
commercially confidential information regarding specific 
investments.  
It should be noted the time needed to obtain data from 
Swedfund was protracted, with the result that this evaluation took 
more than twice as long as was scheduled. There are numerous 
reasons for this: concerns over commercial confidentiality; not 
having the data in the form needed (in part because of periodic 
changes from one data collection system to another); and resources 
constraints – Swedfund is a small DFI with limited staff who are all 
fully engaged in their activities. The fact that data was not always 
available in a comparable form, clearly accentuated these resources 
constraints.  
In terms of content, a number of data issues also need to be 
raised. First, compared with some other DFIs, Swedfund’s current 
and historical portfolio is quite small. This precludes most 
quantitative techniques, but also means that the impacts we do see 
can be heavily skewed by single investments. Second, data is only 
available for a small number of years. This is three years in some 
cases, but only two in others. This relates to the changes in 
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indicators and data collection techniques described above: to be 
valuable, indicators need to be comparable over time. The 
implementation of a new framework disrupts this, so any data 
collected under the same approach can be compared.  
Third, there is no baseline data available, so it is not possible to 
say for sure what changes have occurred over the full life of 
investments, but only what has happened during the two or three 
year that data is available. This means that very positive (or negative 
impacts) could have happened at earlier stages of the Swedfund 
investment, but we have no way of knowing this. Fourth, our 
analysis is restricted to the data Swedfund collects. While a case can 
be made for the indicators used, we would have ideally liked access 
to a larger dataset (though this is not doubt true for all evaluations).  
Fifth, while financial data was provided for 2013-15, these were 
reliant on stakeholder information which was not available evenly 
across the indicators. For example, in 2014 the response rate for 
employment was 72 percent but for tax paid it was 31 percent. Sixth, 
Swedfund’s approach to ESG issues is relatively new, restricting the 
conclusions that can be drawn on its impacts. For example, the ESG 
questionnaire was not a requirement for investments made prior to 
Swedfund’s “Policy for Sustainable Development” signed in 2010. 
More detailed data issues are discussed further below.  
3.2.1 Financial data  
Data was provided by Swedfund for both equity and loans. This 
covered forty-two separate equity fund investments, most of which 
are currently live. Data was also provided for 26 active loans. Finally, 
Swedfund provided limited data, through their annual reports for 27 
financial exits from investments. These include investments that 
were exited early due to a shift in Swedfund’s priority regions, or 
because this was judged to be desirable vis-à-vis maximising 
development impacts. For investee revenues, EBITDA and 
Employment we have data for three years: 2013, 2014 and 2015, 
whereas we have tax data for 2014, 2015 and 2016. As tax revenue 
is only really meaningful when expressed as a proportion of 
revenues, this effectively means we only have tax data for two years: 
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2014 and 2015. Table 5 summarises the data accessed, and the type 
of information this entailed.  
Table 5. Financial data provided by Swedfund 
 No. of 
investments  
Type of Data Covered 
Equity 
Funds 
42 Status, Vintage, Nature of Business, Financial 
Accounts Data, Region, Country, Sector, GICs 
classification, Revenue (2013-2015), EBITDA, 
Employment (2013-2015), Tax Paid (2014-2015) 
 
Loans 26 Status, Vintage, Nature of Business, Financial 
Accounts Data, Region, Country, Sector, GICs 
classification, Revenue (2013-2015), EBITDA, 
Employment (2013-2015), Tax Paid (2014-2015) 
 
Exit 
Data 
27 Vintage, Year of Exit, Holding Period, Region, 
Country, Industry Instrument, Invested 
Amount, Exited Amount, Profit Loss, IRR  
3.2.2 Economic, social and governance data 
Before entering into an investment, Swedfund will undertake an 
analysis of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. 
Where problems are identified, conditions may be attached to the 
investment. In addition, all firms in the portfolio (or equity fund 
managers) are required to complete an annual ESG survey to 
monitor performance. The 2014 questionnaire has 132 questions 
covering a wide variety of issues. Questions also come in different 
forms. Some refer to outcomes (e.g. carbon emissions), while others 
refer to processes (e.g. has the firm signed up to ILO guidelines). 
Swedfund provided anonymised ESG data for 2014 and 2015, 
enabling us to link (anonymously) to the financial data for the same 
investees. We were also allowed access to questionnaires from 2012. 
While these were in a different format and varied significantly, there 
was considerable overlap in relation to questions of process and 
rights of the employee (such as the freedom of association). 
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4. Assessment of Swedfund’s 
development impact  
In this section we assess Swedfund’s development impact in three 
ways. First, impact is assessed on an ex-ante basis in terms of asset 
allocation. As described in section 2.1, potential development 
impacts will be influenced by asset allocation in important ways. We 
therefore review Swedfund’s current portfolio on this basis. Second, 
we present ex post findings of development impact based upon the 
data provided by Swedfund. As well as presenting numerical results 
thematically in areas such as financial performance or employment 
effects, we have identified particularly interesting findings and gone 
back to Swedfund for an explanation of the context surrounding 
these investments, and their understanding of the result. While it is 
interesting to know that a significant number of jobs were created 
or lost in a particular location, sector and time-period, it is more 
useful to understand why this happened. To what extent was this 
the result of trends in the sector or location, for example, or can be 
attributed to the activities of Swedfund? While time and resources 
have not allowed us to delve as deeply as we would have liked into 
these critical issues, we hope that the boxes at the end of each 
section do provide some insight.  
 Ex-ante assessment of asset allocation  
Before examining current asset allocation in some detail, we first 
look at how the portfolio has evolved in recent years in certain key 
respects. 
4.1.1 Historical changes (2009-14) 
Swedfund’s portfolio grew significantly over this period, from a little 
over SEK 2,500 million in 2009, to 3,500 in 2014. Chart 1 shows 
how the geographical distribution of the portfolio changed over the 
same period. As we can see, there has been a marked shift in the 
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portfolio towards Africa and away from Asia, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America. 
This reflects a strategic decision to focus more in low income 
countries (LICs) in general, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, 
which is reflected in Swedfund’s 2013 integrated report: “Swedfund 
has invested significantly in Eastern Europe. Incomes have now risen so much 
there that Swedfund no longer feels it is so urgent to invest in this region. 
…Swedfund’s role of trying to identify and support businesses at an early stage 
in demanding and risk-filled markets is therefore more useful in the poorer 
countries of Africa and many parts of Asia” (Swedfund 2013).  
From a development impact perspective, this is positive. As 
described in section 2.1, potential impacts will be greatest in lower-
income countries. Link 6 of the causal chain described in section 3.1 
assumes that investments are focused in countries where the 
potential impact is greatest (i.e. where poverty is more severe). All 
other things being equal, therefore, we would expect this to 
positively affect Swedfund’s overall development impact. 
Chart 1: Geographical evolution of portfolio 
 
Source: Swedfund (2016)  
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Looking at the sectoral allocations over the same period, we find the 
most important sectors in 2009 to be infrastructure, industry and 
manufacturing, and financial services. By 2014, these remained the 
three largest sectors, but their relative importance has changed 
significantly, with finance now the largest sector, followed by 
infrastructure, and industry and manufacturing.14 
While the continuing focus on infrastructure and manufacturing 
is positive in terms of potential development impact, it is not clear 
that the evidence would support a sharp increase in the weighting 
for the financial sector that has taken place. As discussed above, 
Swedfund is far from alone amongst DFIs in making this change, 
but this does not alter this fact.  
A final point concerns agriculture. In 2009, just 1.4 percent of 
investments were made in agriculture. By 2014, however, this had 
fallen further to 0.4 percent. Again, Swedfund is in line with a 
number of other DFIs that have made similar changes. Once again, 
however, this does not seem to be justifiable in terms of potential 
development impact, regardless of the difficulties of investing in the 
sector.  
We conclude this historical comparison by looking at the weight 
of different financial instruments in the portfolio between 2009 and 
2014, where the main change has been rapid growth in the weight 
of loans. ‘Guarantees & options’, which figured slightly in 2009, had 
disappeared by 2014 (Swedfund, 2015). From a potential 
development impact perspective, an increase in the weighting of 
loans relative to equities has implications. As will be explored later 
in this paper, equity investments create scope to influence the 
behaviour of firms – thereby potentially enhancing development 
impacts – in ways that loans do not. Increasing the weight of loans 
may reduce the potential to create impact.  
                                                 
14  Swedfund does not provide a comparative historical breakdown of asset 
allocation for its full portfolio. These figures are therefore taken from the EDFI: 
Source: EDFI (http://www.edfi.be/component/downloads/downloads 
/129.html).  
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Given this risk, it is important to note that direct investment in 
firms’ equity by Swedfund increased in importance over the period 
in question, while investment through equity funds fell significantly 
(ibid). These latter types of investment do not provide the 
opportunities to influence behaviour (e.g. there are no seats on the 
board), which avoids the risks associated with a shift away from 
equity investments.   
4.1.2 Current asset allocation  
As of the end of 2016, Swedfund’s total outstanding investments 
were around SEK 3,000 million. Around 47 percent were loans, and 
53 percent equity, the same as 2014. The first point, therefore, is 
that the increasing weight of loans in the portfolio does not appear 
to have continued. 
Chart 2: Regional distribution of portfolio 2016  
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Chart 2 show the regional breakdown for the full portfolio (loans 
plus equity) at end 2016. Africa is by far the largest region, with 59 
percent of total assets, much the same as in 2014, though it should 
59%25%
12%
4%
Africa Asia Europé Latin America
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be noted that the 2014 figures are from Swedfund’s own reports, 
while Chart 2 are our own estimates based on data received. There 
may be some differences in measurement approaches, but no 
particular increase in weighting can be observed.  
Table 6 compares country exposures for loans and equities. The 
two largest countries are Kenya and India in both cases, with the 
equity exposure to Kenya being particularly large. 
 Table 6. Country-level exposures 2016  
Note: Per cent of loan or equity portfolios by value. Source: Swedfund (internal) & own 
calculations 
 
Reflecting the strategic focus on Africa, the largest categories of 
investment in both cases are to firms (or equity funds) with a Pan-
African focus. For equities, this is almost 40 percent of the portfolio. 
Some anomalies can also be observed, such as the heavy loan 
exposure to Georgia, and equity investment in Serbia. In both cases, 
these represent almost 6 percent of investments of this form. Of the 
four largest countries for both equities and loans, only one – 
Tanzania – is a low-income country. Of the others, India and Kenya 
are classified as lower-middle income countries, while China, 
Georgia and Serbia are upper-middle income countries. These are 
no doubt legacy investments (Swedfund invest for 7-9 years), and 
Kenya was classified as a low-income country until relatively 
recently. It is also likely that investments in particular countries 
reflect historical preferences of the Swedish government – the 
Georgia weighting would be the result of previous instructions for 
Swedfund to increase its focus in the former Soviet Union, for 
example.  
  Loans (%)  Equities (%) 
Kenya 6.82  Kenya 15.33 
India 13.04  India  11.90 
Georgia 5.87  China 6.92 
Tanzania 2.87  Serbia 5.97 
Global  7.57  Global 5.00 
Africa 25.53  Africa 39.55 
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Chart 3: Sectoral distribution of portfolio 2016 
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Chart 3 gives the sector breakdown for the full portfolio by value. 
The previous sector allocations are not directly comparable, as this 
was compiled by the EDFI, and the classification of services is 
different. The point about the rapid growth in finance sector 
investment still holds, however, as this comparison was done using 
the same approach. As of end 2016, the largest sector is 
manufacturing with 34 percent of total assets. Financial institutions 
and fund investments each account for around 18 percent, and 
services for 17 percent. Energy investments account for 11 percent 
of investments.  
Another change that does not appear in these figures is the fact 
that Swedfund has doubled its weighting to renewable energy 
investments, which is in line with its evolving mandate and funding 
arrangements. As described in section 2.2.1, Swedfund received 
SEK 400 million from the Swedish government in 2016 to promote 
“a switch to renewable energy” (Swedfund, 2016). 
The significant investment in manufacturing is very positive 
from a potential development impact perspective. On the other 
hand, the 18 percent weighting to financial institutions, seems 
34%
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17%
11%
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higher than its potential impact would justify. Table 7 breaks down 
these allocations by region. 
Table 7. Sector breakdown by region  
  Energy 
Financial 
instit. Fund 
Manu-
fact. Other Services 
Africa 3.26% 17.74% 18.11% 42.56% 3.73% 14.59% 
Asia 34.19% 5.53% 23.89% 18.19% 0.00% 18.20% 
Europe 3.59% 51.04% 10.48% 34.90% 0.00% 0.00% 
Lat.Am. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Note: Per cent in region by sector. Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
While all Latin American investments are in services, and those in 
Europe are weighted towards financial institutions, outstanding 
investments in Asia and Africa are more diversified. The main 
difference between the two regions is the greater importance of 
energy and fund investments in Asia, which is balanced by the 
greater weighting for financial institutions and manufacturing in 
Africa. 
In terms of potential development impact, the very high 
manufacturing weighting in Africa is particularly positive. As well as 
being a ‘transformative’ sector (link 2 in causal chain), these 
investments are more likely to be in lower-income countries (link 6 
in causal chain). The high weighting to finance in Africa is less 
clearly positive in this regard.  
Table 8 compares sector distributions by value for loans and 
equities. Both have significant exposure to the manufacturing 
sector, though this is much higher for loans than equities (37.85 and 
30.17 percent respectively). For loans, the next largest sector is 
finance (26.56), followed by energy, and then services. 
The largest category for equities is investments through equity 
funds, which accounts for approximately a third of the equities 
portfolio. After manufacturing the next largest sector is services, 
followed by finance with 11.9 percent of investments.  
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Table 8. Sector distribution by instrument 2016 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
To summarise, the shift in country focus towards lower-income 
countries in Africa is positive in terms of potential development 
impact (link 6 in causal chain). There is scope to go further in this 
regard, though the long-term nature of Swedfund’s investments, and 
the influence of historical directives received on country focus need 
to be taken into account in this regard. High weighting to 
manufacturing and infrastructure15 is positive as these are relatively 
‘transformative sectors’. In contrast, the fact that agriculture has 
been eliminated entirely from the portfolio is surprising, as the 
literature suggests that agriculture is the most transformative sector 
in lower-income countries. Finally, the increased weighting to 
finance is difficult to justify in terms of ex-ante potential, not least 
as assessing impact when investments are made through financial 
intermediaries is problematic.  
  
                                                 
15 See footnote 16. In addition, from analysis of the GICs classifications we find 
that 8.42% of the portfolio is in hotels, integrated telecommunications, and 
ports. Additionally, we note that it is likely that investments in infrastructure are 
greater as they may feature as part of the indirect investment funds, where there 
is less visibility in the available data to see on sector.   
Loans  (%)  Equities  (%) 
Manufacturing 37.85  Fund 33.74 
Finance 26.56  Manufacturing 30.17 
Energy  18.63  Services 21.59 
Services 12.81  Finance 10.04 
Other  4.15  Other 0.49 
   Energy 3.98 
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5. Ex-post impact assessment 
In this section we report impact findings in two areas: financial and 
economic; and environmental, social and governance (ESG). In 
each case, we first present results from the whole portfolio (loans + 
equities), before reporting on each separately. As described above, 
these results are augmented by text boxes at the end of each section, 
which contain Swedfund’s explanations for some of the most 
interesting findings that are presented.  
 Financial and economic impacts  
Swedfund seeks to make positive economic impacts in the 
companies in which it invests. Here we look at three elements of 
this: financial sustainability; employment; and tax paid.  
5.1.1 Financial sustainability  
In this section we present findings on two aspects of financial 
sustainability: revenues generated; and EBITDA. 16  The first is a 
measure of economic activity (and pricing power), while the second 
is a comparative measure of firm performance, which takes account 
of costs as well as revenues.  
Table 9 describes the evolution of revenues from Swedfund’s 
firms over the period for which we have data. This includes both 
loans and equities. As we can see, the number of respondents falls 
in each year, so the total revenues figure is not informative. The 
minimum figure shows a significant loss of more than SEK 80 
million for one firm in 2014. Of these summary figures, the average 
figure does provide some information, where we see a significant 
increase in average annual revenues from 2013 to 2014. This falls 
back slightly in 2015, but remains 63 percent higher than the start 
of the period. 
                                                 
16 Earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation or amortization.  
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Table 9. Total portfolio revenues summary (SEK millions) 
 2013 2014 2015 
Responses 52 48 38 
Total 15158.02 24761.76 18135.54 
Average 291.50 515.87 477.25 
Min -9.28 -81.17 -1.88 
Max 6572.13 7980.45 3404.44 
Standard deviation 946.53 1574.66 879.10 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations 
 
Table 10 provides the same information for the equity portfolio 
only. As we can see, the number of non-responses increases 
significantly over the period. After staying relatively stable in the 
first two years, the standard deviation of revenues falls sharply in 
2015, due to a significant fall in the maximum revenues. This is also 
reflected in the average figures, which stay broadly constant for 
2013-14, before halving in 2015. A closer look at the underlying 
figures, shows that these large shifts are driven by a very small 
number of equity investments, underlying the risks that Swedfund 
faces. An important part of this is that Swedfund is a relatively small 
DFI, which makes it difficult to diversify sufficiently to deal with 
idiosyncratic risks.  
 
Table 10. Equity portfolio: revenue summary (SEK millions) 
 
2013 2014 2015 
Responses  33 29 23 
No responses 9 13 19 
Total 9956.90 10601.66 4080.23 
Average 301.72 365.57 177.40 
Min  -9.28 -81.17 -1.88 
Max 6572.13 7530.46 1571.45 
SD 1155.25 1407.71 438.09 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
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Table 11. Equity portfolio: net revenue impacts over three 
periods (SEK millions) 
 
Change  
13-14 
Change 
14-15 
Change  
13-15 
Responses 29 22 22 
No response  13 20 20 
Total change 882.02 -5730.63 -4948.12 
Average change 30.41 -260.48 -224.91 
Max 958.33 84.49 92.59 
Min -253.22 -5997.73 -5039.41 
SD 186.43 1281.64 1077.35 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 11 highlights this volatility well, where a huge drop in total 
and average revenues in 2014 is driven by very large losses in a single 
equity investment, as shown by the minimum figure in the middle 
period. It is noteworthy that this includes results for equity funds 
and portfolio equity companies, the latter being those which 
Swedfund invests in directly. Disaggregating these types of 
investments, we find all portfolio equity firms reporting positive 
revenues over the period (77% over 2013-2015), highlighting the 
fact that losses are concentrated in equity fund investments.  
Table 12. Loan portfolio: revenue summary (SEK millions) 
 
2013 2014 2015 
Responses 19 19 15 
Total  5201.12 14160.10 14055.32 
Average 273.74 745.27 937.02 
Max 1493.87 7980.45 3404.44 
Min 2.86 0.52 2.85 
Standard Deviation 406.59 1816.56 1169.05 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 12 turns to the loan portfolio. For revenues, we see a 
considerably better performance than with equities, with 175 
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percent growth in average revenues in 2014, and a 25 percent 
increase in 2015. The 2015 figure compares favourably with a 
halving of equity investment revenues at the same time.   
Table 13. Loan portfolio: net revenue (SEK millions) 
 
2013-2014 2014-2015 2013-2015 
Responses (for both years) 18 13 13 
Total Change  1212.50 2721.46 3617.05 
Net Average Change 67.36 209.34 278.23 
Min  -21.65 1.49 -9.71 
Max 334.28 1156.69 1444.15 
SD 111.71 405.64 484.07 
Percentage Reduced Revenue 27.78% 0% 15.38% 
Percentage Increase Revenue 72.22% 100.00% 84.62% 
Total change as % of base year 24.41% 49.42% 78.46% 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 13 confirms these results: 2014 saw 72 percent of investees 
report rising revenues, rising to 100 percent in the following year. 
The average reported increase also rose threefold between the 
periods. Total reported revenues increased by almost 70 percent 
from 2013 to 2015.  
To summarise, therefore, Swedfund saw an increase in total and 
average revenues for firms across the portfolio over the period in 
question, which was largely driven by the loan portfolio. Losses 
were heavily focused in a small number of equity fund investments.  
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Table 14. Total portfolio EBITDA (SEK millions) 
 
2013  2014  2015  
Responses 55 53 44 
Total  1871.02 3699.77 3881.49 
Average 34.02 69.81 88.22 
Min -165.30 -183.73 -485.95 
Max 548.02 1191.43 1118.31 
SD 118.64                                                                                                                               216.85                                 283.99                                                                                          
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 14 provides summary figures for EBITDA. 2014 saw average 
EBITDA increase by 105 percent from the previous year, while 
growth in 2015 was 26.4 percent. Variability in the portfolio also 
increased, with both minimum and maximum reported EBITDA 
more than doubling over the period, and standard deviation 
increasing sharply.   
Table 15. Equity portfolio: EBITDA summary 
 2013 2014 2015 
Responses 36 34 27 
No response 6 8 15 
Total 735.00 981.15 -664.80 
Average 20.42 28.86 -24.62 
Min  -165.30 -183.73 -485.95 
Max 404.03 471.61 114.72 
SD 104.05 131.09 103.95 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 15 looks at EBITDA results for equity investments. As with 
total revenues we see a deterioration in performance towards the 
end of the period. The very large minimum performance (i.e. a loss 
of SEK 486 million in 2015) is clearly an important part of this.  
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Table 16. Equity portfolio: net EBITDA change (SEK millions) 
 
2013-14  2014-15  2013-15  
No. Companies Providing 
EBITDA Data for both years* 
34 26 26 
Net Average Change 6.65 -58.20 -51.40 
Total  225.96 -1513.31 -1336.35 
Min  -230.96 -930.41 -889.98 
Max 489.36 146.58 138.08 
Standard Deviation 100.49 207.01 190.51 
Percentage Loss EBITDA 50.00% 38.46% 53.85% 
Percentage Increase EBITDA 50.00% 61.54% 46.15% 
Total change as % of base year 29.92% -168.32% -185.07% 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations . *Only EBIT data was provided in 6, 5, 
and 11 cases for 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively). Source: Swedfund (internal) and 
authors’ calculations 
 
Table 16 shows that it was net losses in 2014-5 that drove the 
underperformance, with one equity investment in particular (-SEK 
930 million) accounting for two thirds of the total losses. In the first 
period, half of firms reported losses and half gains. In the second 
period this actually improved to 40/60. That nearly 60 percent of 
firms were reporting gains from 2014-15, but the total loss was so 
large, highlights the fact that losses were concentrated in the larger 
equity investments.  
Table 17. Loan portfolio: EBITDA summary 
 
2013 2014 2015 
Count 19 19 17 
Sum 1136.02 2718.61 4546.29 
Average 59.79 143.08 267.43 
Max 548.02 1191.43 1118.31 
Min -36.55 -46.50 -40.29 
Standard Deviation 141.78 309.03 378.92 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
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As with revenues, the EBITDA performance of companies from 
the loan portfolio is significantly better than for equity investments. 
The average figure for 2014 was 139 percent up from the previous 
year, while the 2015 figure shows annual growth of 87 percent 
(Table 17). This is slightly better than the revenue figures, suggesting 
that investee firms were improving their productivity as well as sales.  
To summarise, 2013-15 saw revenues grow and EBITDA 
improve for Swedfund’s investee companies, both in total and on 
average. This growth, however, was driven by the loan portfolio, 
and to a lesser extent, equity investments in individual firms. Equity 
investment through funds, in contrast, performed poorly over the 
same period, with most losses concentrated in a few large 
investments.  
This highlights the risks that a relatively small DFI such as 
Swedfund faces. Given its size, there are limits to how much risk 
can be diversified away. As Swedfund is increasingly focusing on 
lower-income countries where risks are likely to be higher, this 
problem is likely to become greater. Seeking to achieve greater 
impact by investing in places where needs are greatest increases the 
risk of losses.  
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Box 1: Behind the data: Swedfund’s approach to Financial 
Sustainability 
Swedfund approaches the financial sustainability of the firms in which it 
invests in two ways. First, it seeks to invest in companies that are, or have 
the potential to be, financially sustainable. Second, it aims to improve the 
financial sustainability of firms through engagement, either as a Board 
member for equity investments, or as an active lender. In order to 
understand better how this works in practice, we sought clarifications on 
three interesting findings emerging from the data on financial 
sustainability. The questions, and summaries of Swedfund’s responses to 
them, are given below. 
 
1.From a financial sustainability perspective, what are the potential 
advantages of multiple investments in the same sector or region (e.g. 
health in Kenya)?’ 
“For country and sector focus, we thoroughly analyse both our mission and 
the directives from our owners before deciding in which countries and 
sectors we believe we can achieve the most. By making multiple 
investments in the same sector/region we also enable the creation of 
investment platforms/portfolios. This not only strengthens the potential 
for value creation (e.g., knowledge transfers) but also increases our 
potential exit options…Our strategy from 2014-2017 has been to place a 
stronger focus on a smaller number of countries and also to increase our 
sector focus. We’re a small organization (35 people) and concentrating on 
certain countries/markets/sectors is a necessity to ensure that we are able 
to apply an holistic approach – social impact, sustainability and financial 
viability – before, during and when exiting an investment.  
Increasing effectiveness and knowledge is naturally an iterative process – 
we learn constantly from our investments and experiences. It is worthwhile 
keeping in mind, that we have an average holding period of each investee 
of 9-11 years. Hence, while our insights, goals and targets may change 
rapidly, it is easier to enact change in newer investments than in those 
made a long time ago. Our mandate stipulates that we engage in some of 
the poorest, but as a consequence also some of the most difficult, 
countries and regions in the world”. 
 
“Therefore, while we on average make significant strides in combatting and 
reducing poverty, there might be individual cases which do not evolve and 
develop as we had intended and wished from the start.”  
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2. What is the explanation for the large revenue losses concentrated in 
equity fund(s) during 2014? 
“Revenue losses of investees in our funds (rather than the fund itself) may 
have been likely during 2014-2015 because of market factors. For instance, 
one fund has broad exposure towards the natural resources sector and 
therefore revenues (and the valuation) of the fund decreased as 
commodities prices fell during this period. In another case, Swedfund took 
over an old fund, and some of the portfolio companies where sold whereas 
others were transferred to Swedfund – the last company in 2015. The fund 
was not liquidated and equity was returned to Swedfund in 2017.” 
 
3. Why did loan portfolio revenue grow so rapidly between 2013-15? 
“Swedfund loan portfolio revenue has risen for two reasons. 1) When 
providing a loan and earmarking it to a specific group (SME’s, lending to 
women etc), Swedfund’s investment makes capital accessible to 
companies in which Swedfund would not have been able to invest, either 
directly or through equity. These groups are in great need of capital and 
are essential for achieving inclusive growth. 2) It has been a necessity for 
Swedfund to decrease volatility and generate more predictable returns 
from the portfolio and more continuous cash flows to achieve long term 
cover of  annual operational expenses. Furthermore, as mandated by 
Swedfund’s shareholder (the Swedish Government) it is essential to 
achieve both societal impact and financial return, in a sustainable manner. 
The increased allocation to loans is aligned with this ambition.” 
Source: Interview with Swedfund staff 
5.1.2 Employment 
Swedfund, like a number of other DFIs such as CDC, places great 
emphasis on job creation. In this section, we present only direct jobs 
impacts – i.e. jobs created or lost by the companies that Swedfund 
invests in. This is not the only employment effect, however, as direct 
jobs can lead to indirect job creation in the supply chain, and 
induced job creation across the economy through faster growth. If 
the aim is to maximise total employment impact, the sum of these 
three effects is the relevant statistic.  
As described in section 2.1.4, CDC estimates these total impacts 
for potential investments and uses these estimates to identify sectors 
with the most employment-creating potential. We also argued that 
these results are both location and sector specific, making it 
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questionable to generalise from either one sector to another in the 
same country, or from the same sector in one country to another. It 
is outside the scope of these study to accurately estimate these 
indirect and induced employment effects for each sector and 
country that Swedfund invests in. As a result, we report only direct 
jobs impacts here.  
Table 18. Total portfolio employment summary 
 
2013 2014 2015 
Responses  40 49 43 
Total 86933 102286 108623 
Average 2173.33 2087.47 2526.12 
Min 1 1 8 
Max 21418 21418 26571 
SD 4842.18 4411.31 5494.90 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations   
 
Table 18 describes total employment across the Swedfund portfolio, 
combining loans and equity. As we see, total employment increases 
over the period, but so do the number of reporting firms. The 
average figure falls slightly in 2014, before increasing slightly more 
in 2015. Overall, however, there is little change to be observed at 
the portfolio level in terms of employment.  
Turning to equity, the summary figures tell the same story, with 
a slight fall in average employment in 2014 followed by a slightly 
larger rise the following year.  
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Table 19. Equity portfolio net employment 
 
2013-2014 2014-2015 2013-2015 
No. companies providing data 
for both years 
24 24 19 
Net average change -56.54 -103.08 -210.37 
Total change across Reporting 
Companies 
-1357 -2474 -3997 
Total change as % of reported 
employment (in base year) 
-1.68% -3.39% -6.30% 
Min  -1914 -4200 -4200 
Max 2379 1220 3599 
SD 676.82 964.42 1384.78 
Percentage reporting loss 
employment 
41.67% 37.50% 57.89% 
Percentage static 25.00% 25.00% 0.00% 
Percentage increase 
employment 
33.33% 37.50% 42.11% 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 19 focuses on net employment impacts for companies 
reporting in each year in the period. Here the picture is less positive, 
with a net loss of 6.3% of employment across the equity portfolio 
from 2013 to 2015. Neither is it the case that these losses are 
concentrated in just a few firms, as at least half of firms report losses 
of employment in each period, rising to 57.9 percent over the full 
three years. Whereas revenue impacts are driven by losses in a few, 
large investments, these employment impacts appear more 
systematic. Employment creation is a key part of the causal chain 
described in section 3.1. It is also central to the rationale for private 
sector development in general, and DFI investment in particular. It 
may be that the negative findings are influenced by broader trends 
such as negative movements in the business cycle, but we can also 
say that there is no evidence of positive direct job creation resulting 
from Swedfund’s investments across the portfolio as a whole.  
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Table 20. Equity portfolio: net employment by equity mode 
 Fund – Active Portfolio Company Co-financing Facility 
Reporting years 13-14 14-15 13-15 13-14 14-15 13-15 13-14 14-15 13-15 
No. companies providing data both years 8 8 6 14 15 12 2 1 1 
Net Average Change -10.4 -415 -567 -91 56.1 -49.8 0 5 5 
Total Change Across Reporting Companies -83 -3321 -3404 -1274 842 -598 0 5 5 
Total change as % of reported employment (in base year) -0.12 -5.32 -6.11 -12.7 8.06 -7.83    
Percentage reporting loss  50.0 25.0 66.6 42.9 46.6 58.3 0 0 0 
Percentage reporting increase 12.5 37.5 33.3 50 33.3 41.6 0 100 100 
Min  -1914 -4200 -4200 -916 -175 -357 0 5 5 
Max 2379 1220 3599 168 954 141 0 5 5 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations 
 
Table 20 breaks down net employment effects by mode of equity. This enables us to see that employment losses are 
greatest for equity funds, with a very large loss of more than 4,000 jobs reported in 2014-5 for one fund (see 
minimum figure for that year). We also see significant job losses in portfolio equity firms, however. While funds and 
individual firms have examples of significant gains, total and net average changes for the period are negative for 
both, and the proportion reporting losses is more than half in both cases (66.6 and 58.3 percent respectively). 
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 Table 21. Equity portfolio: net employment impacts by vintage 
Investment vintage 2000-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015  
Reporting years 13/14 14/15 13/15 13/14 14/15 13/15 13/14 14/15 13/15 
No. companies providing employment data (both years) 7 6 5 14 10 11 3 8 3 
Total change as a proportion of employment (base year) -6.31 -10.2 -14.6 5.92 7.26 20.4 13.4 10.4 22.9 
Percentage reporting losses 57.1 33.3 80.0 42.9 50.0 63.6 0 25 0 
Min -1914 -4200 -4200 -326 -175 -357 0 -33 5 
Max 168 556 54 2379 1220 3599 8 954 141 
SD 750 1757 1727 654 397 1112 4.35 336.21 77.7 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 21 breaks the employment figures down by vintage of the investment. This is organised into three groups. 
Investments made between 2000-5, 2006-10, and 2011-15. As highlighted in bold, the greatest losses are found for 
the older investments, which lost almost 15 percent of their workforce from 2013 to 2015. In contrast, investments 
made in the most recent period, saw substantial increases in employment over the full period (22.9 percent), and 
double figure growth in each sub-period.17  
                                                 
17 Note sub sample of three investments – one of which started with two jobs in 2013 and increased to 143, hence surprisingly high 
figures. 
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Table 22. Equity portfolio: regional distribution of employment impacts 
 
Africa Asia 
 Reporting years 13-14 14-15 13-15 13-14 14-15 13-15 
Companies providing data for both years 12 13 9 4 5 4 
Net average change -48.75 130.7 229.2 -119 -830 -1408 
Total change across reporting companies -585 1699 2063 -535 -4152 -5634 
Total change as a proportion of employment (in base year) -1.92 4.77 7.43 -1.32 -14.5 -21.1 
Percentage reporting losses 33.33 23.08 44.44 50.00 60.00 75.00 
Min  -1914 -175 -1358 -534 -4200 -4200 
Max 2379 1220 3599 0 954 200 
SD 960.9 368.2 1341.6 266.8 2021 2033 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 22 breaks down the equity portfolio regionally. Here we see (again in bold) that most job losses are in Asian 
investments, which saw a 21 percent fall in employment over the period, compared with a net gain of 7 percent in 
Africa. As Swedfund has switched its focus towards Africa relative to other regions, this is an encouraging finding, 
not least because the development impact of job creation may be greater in lower-income countries (i.e. link 6 from 
causal chain in section 3.1).  
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 Table 23. Equity portfolio: sector distribution of net employment effects 
 Services Fund Manufacturing 
Reporting years 2013-14 2014-15 2013-15 2013-15 2014-15 2013-15 2013-15 2014-15 2013-15 
Companies providing data  5 7 3 7 7 5 6 5 6 
Net Average Change 37 131 8 -11.7 -503 -720 -164 -37 -42 
Total change 185 919 24 -82 -3522 -3604 -982 -186 -254 
Total change as a proportion of 
employment  13.9 23.7 5.3 -0.12 -5.78 -6.64 -19.4 -5.48 -7.21 
Percentage reporting losses 0.00 42.86 33.33 42.86 28.57 80.00 66.67 60.00 66.67 
Min 0 -33 -11 -1914 -4200 -4200 -916 -175 -181 
Max 168 954 23 2379 1220 3599 35 19 54 
SD 73.3 363 17.3 1265 1773 2851 370 78.3 83.9 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
Table 23 looks at employment effects by sector for the equity portfolio. As highlighted, we see losses concentrated 
in manufacturing and through equity funds, where 7.2 and 6.6 percent of jobs are lost respectively. In contrast, 
equity investments in services saw employment rise by 5 percent. To summarise, from 2013 to 2015, Swedfund’s 
equity portfolio saw a net loss of jobs. These were disproportionately concentrated in older investments, Asian 
investments, the manufacturing sector, and investments made through equity funds. Younger, direct, investments – 
particularly those in Africa – were more likely to have seen net job creation over the period considered. 
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Table 24. Loan portfolio: employment summary 
 
2013 2014 2015 
Responses 15 18 15 
Total  5986 12188 11296 
Average 399.06 677.11 753.06 
Max 1600 4900 5117 
Min 4 13 8 
SD  441.35 1140.72 1336.64 
Median 320 314 271 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 24 gives the summary employment figures for the loan 
portfolio. Here total employment has almost doubled. This is 
reflected in the average figures, where total employment again 
almost doubled.  
 
Table 25. Loan portfolio: net employment 
 
2013-14 2014-15 2013-15 
Companies providing data (both 
years) 
15 14 11 
Total change  -276 637 472 
Net average change -18.4 45.5 42.9 
Total change as a proportion of 
employment (in base year) 
-4.6 5.98 13.22 
Percentage  reporting losses 26.67 57.14 45.45 
Min -916 -175 -181 
Max 461 600 501 
SD 281.79 180.55 193.76 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
Looking at net employment effects in table 25, we see solid growth 
over the full loan portfolio between 2013 and 2015 (with a 13 
percent increase relative to the base year). This seems to be on the 
strength of the 2014/2015 period where despite the majority of the 
loans reporting losses in employment, one investee reported jobs 
growth of 600 individuals.  
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Table 26. Loan portfolio: employment impacts by loan status 
 
           Active      Exited 
Reporting 
years 
13-14 14-15 13-15 13-14 14-15 13-15 
Companies 
providing 
data (both 
years) 
12 13 10 3 1 1 
Net Average 
Change 
-12 51.30 65.1 -44 -30 -179 
Total Change 
Across 
Reporting 
Companies 
-144 667 651 -132 -30 -179 
Total change 
as % of base 
year 
employment 
-2.62 6.45 20.87 -26.51 -9.97 -39.78 
Percentage 
reporting 
losses 
25.0 53.9 40.0 33.33 100 100 
Min  -916 -175 -181 -149 -30 -179 
Max 461 600 501 17 -30 -179 
SD 315.2 186.6 188.9 91.33 N.A N.A 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Table 26 breaks down employment impacts by status of loan – i.e. 
active or exited.18 As we can see, losses are heavily concentrated in 
exited investments, in particular, one company which shed almost 
40 percent of jobs from 2013 to 2015. Over the same period, in 
contrast, firms with active Swedfund loans saw an increase in 
employment of more than 20 percent. 
                                                 
18 These refer to the current state of the loan as of October 2016. While the loan 
may be exited, the company may still be on the Swedfund’s books until the end 
of the financial year, hence why it is a relatively minor part of the portfolio. 
Another possible reason for the company still being on the current portfolio is 
that contract negotiations may be ongoing for additional financing.  
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For the rest of the loan portfolio, we find positive employment 
effects are somewhat stronger for more recent loans. Regionally, 
losses are more likely in Asia than Africa. No sector employment 
effects were found in the loan portfolio.  
To summarise, therefore, the overall portfolio shows little 
employment impacts, positive or negative. This masks considerable 
variation, however. Swedfund’s equity portfolio saw a net loss of 
jobs, which were disproportionately concentrated in older 
investments, Asian investments, the manufacturing sector, and 
investments made through equity funds. Younger, direct, 
investments – particularly those in Africa – were more likely to have 
seen net job creation over the period considered. The loan portfolio, 
in contrast, saw net job creation, particularly in more recent loans, 
and those located in Africa.  
Box 2: Behind the data: understanding how Swedfund affects 
employment 
Helping to create good jobs is a key pillar of Swedfund’s strategy. 
Understanding why significant variation in employment take place is therefore 
important. Looking at the employment data, four questions emerged. The 
questions, and Swedfund’s responses to them, are given below.  
1. Why is there such large variation in employment levels from equity funds, 
with differences between years running into the thousands (Table 21)? 
“Our ambition with fund investments is to reach areas, types of investees (such 
as SMEs), sectors (renewable energy), countries and themes (women led 
enterprises) which otherwise would not have been possible for us to reach 
through direct investments given our experience, skill set, presence, and other 
networks…Given the importance of fund investments in our overall portfolio 
and ability to enact change and reduce poverty, our approach when evaluating 
funds has been significantly improved over the past 3-4 years. This covers 
among other topics a fund’s track record, its concentration risk, management 
of ESG issues, tax questions, organisational structure and other areas – which 
on average should strengthen impact and financial viability of the funds and of 
Swedfund in the future.” 
“Variation between funds can be quite significant. For instance, one fund 
experienced an average employment growth of 21% during the 2013-15 
period. In 2014-2015 period 7 of 8 portfolio investments (of that fund) 
reported increases in employment. This was on the back of strong 
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developments in each of the companies in general, and a fund manager 
essentially doing a good job. This can be compared to another fund, with nine 
companies, out of those, 5 expanded, while 4 experienced loss of employment. 
One of the companies that lost employees accounted for 41% of the total 
number of employees in the fund in 2013, so overall performance was 
negative.”  
2. Why do older investments suffer greater employment losses than newer 
ones (Table 20)? 
“The commodities downturn of 2014-2015 affected some of our funds more 
than others. One such investment was a fund which had a particularly large tilt 
towards the resources and mining sector, and other investees also had similar 
albeit not so pronounced exposure to that same sector.” 
3. For economic sectors, why do we see losses in manufacturing and gains 
in the service industries (Table 23)? 
“We have seen a loss of employment in one of our larger manufacturing 
investments, where the company is currently under distress, and the number 
of employees has been reduced accordingly. We must stress that it is only 
voluntary leavers to date.” 
4. Why are losses greater for exited loans compared to current loans 
(Table 26)? 
“We have seen exited loans both increase and shrink the number of 
employees. Generally, in good times a business expands and with that its sales, 
profits, operations in general and of course also its number of employees…For 
instance, one investment (which Swedfund has now exited) went through 
difficult times where it was not able to service the interest payment to 
Swedfund. This poor performance is directly linked to their employment loss. 
On the other side, we have seen loans where revenues increased with an 
average IRR of 22% from 2010-2015. As a result, the number of employees 
increased significantly.” 
Source: Interview with Swedfund staff 
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5.1.3 Tax 
As part of Swedfund’s ‘three pillars’, their impact on society does 
not just consider employment creation, but also aims to ensure that 
investee companies pay the correct amount of tax. Swedfund thus 
collects data, both in its due diligence (as part of screening) and its 
annual monitoring and reporting processes, on taxes paid. 
Swedfund does not invest in firms that have structures designed to 
avoid tax, and has an ongoing dialogue with investees to encourage 
a responsible approach. 
How successful DFIs, including Swedfund, are in these efforts, 
is impossible to say with any certainty. As described in Box 3, there 
are numerous reasons why taxes paid vary from year to year, which 
may have little to do with a company’s willingness to pay taxes, and 
nothing to do with DFIs’ efforts. What we can expect, however, is 
that the worst examples of bad practice do not occur within 
Swedfund’s companies. At a minimum this means no tax evasion 
(illegal), and it would also be hoped that the most egregious 
examples of complex tax avoidance (legal) are eliminated.  
As noted by Senior ESG manager, Karin Askelöf, “In a perfect 
world we would not only disclose the corporate tax paid by portfolio 
companies but also other taxes paid by the companies. That 
information is not easily accessible and at present we cannot verify 
it. However, through our country-by-country reporting of tax we 
have come further than many others.” (Swedfund, 2016 pp. 30). 
While not perfect, 19  this is an important step, which should be 
                                                 
19 It is assumed here that the country where the company operates is the same as 
its tax domicile. This is quite a strong assumption as information on any tax 
haven’s being used by investees is not currently available. In this regard, Brot für 
Alle (2011) noted the direct equity investment of Swedfund in Addax Bioenergy 
(APRODEV, 2013), a Sierra Leonean subsidiary of the company Addax & Oryx 
Group (AOG), domiciled in the tax haven of the British Virgin Islands (BVI). 
As Swedfund does not report taxes generated to countries on a company-by-
company basis (it does so at a country level), it is not possible to know where 
Addax Bioenergy has paid its taxes, and there was clearly scope for “transfer 
pricing”, moving their profits to a holding company based in a tax haven, and 
thus paying little to no taxes. 
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welcomed. International companies generally present tax paid on a 
consolidated, global basis. This makes it impossible to know 
whether the correct amount of tax, relative to profits made, have 
been paid in different countries. Swedfund cannot do this alone of 
course, but it is a sign of commitment to this issue that it is making 
genuine efforts.  
Table 27 notes taxes paid for 2014, 2015, 2016 and highlights the 
problem of access to tax information: across the whole portfolio 
(equity and loans) less than half of the companies responded to 
questions on taxes paid in Swedfund’s annual survey.20 The best 
response rates came from Europe, whereas Asia had the weakest 
response. The role of equity funds, which provide 61 percent of the 
reported tax revenue for 2014, is important. As funds are more likely 
to invest in larger enterprises listed on stock exchanges, tax figures 
can be distorted. Due to small sample size, however, we have 
included funds’ tax results in nominal terms alongside smaller 
investments, though excluded them from the ratios. When 
interpreting the figures below, it is important to bear this in mind.  
While noting the rapid rise in total tax receipts between 2014-
2016, with a sharp fall in 2015, we see a wide variation in the average 
contribution to taxes, both within years and inter-temporally as tax 
receipts vary significantly. As described in the section on data 
limitations, we do not have corresponding revenue data for 2016, so 
can only express taxes paid as a proportion of revenues for 2014 
and 2015. This is unfortunate, as tax data is only meaningful when 
expressed as a ratio. What we can say from the figures we have, is 
that Swedfund’s investee firms paid around 18.5 percent of revenues 
as tax in 2014, falling a little over 3 percent the following year. For 
the reasons given above, equity funds are not included in these 
figures.  
 
                                                 
20 This is partly due to issues regarding data quality. The data provided by 
Swedfund on tax paid contained a significant proportion with zero values. Upon 
correspondence with Swedfund, it seems that zero values of tax could either 
mean zero tax paid or that information had not been collected. It is suggested 
for the future that different coding is used for a non-response vs. a zero tax paid 
allocation.  
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Table 27: Total Portfolio Tax Payments (SEK millions) 
  2014 2015 2016 
Count 21 18 24 
Total 330.06 122.45 992.95 
Average 15.72 6.80 41.37 
Min 0.003423 0.003103 0.005242 
Max 192.28 100.79 262.63 
SD 43.50 23.53 85.12 
Mean Tax Revenue as a % of 
Revenue (Removing Funds) 
18.46% 
(17 Firms) 
3.03% 
(15 Firms) No Data  
Median Tax Revenue as a % of 
Revenue (Removing Funds) 2.34% 0.73% No Data  
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations . Mean Tax Revenue as a % of Revenue 
(Removing Funds see Note 2.  
 
Turning to the equity portfolio in Table 28, we see that the mean 
tax paid is lower for equity investments 2014 than the overall 
portfolio, but slightly higher for 2015. Total average taxes paid 
(which includes equity funds unlike the ratios) are lower for equities 
in every year including 2016, with the difference in 2015 being 
greatest.  
Table 28: Equity Portfolio Tax Payments (SEK millions) 
 2014 2015 2016 
Count 15 13 14 
Total 218.58 21.02 394.71 
Average 14.57 1.62 28.19 
Min 0.003423 0.003103 0.005242 
Max 192.28 6.23 262.63 
SD 49.24 2.08 72.28 
Mean Tax Revenuea  14.78% 3.67 %  N.A 
  (11 firms) (10 firms)  
Median Tax Revenuea 2.34% 1.76% N.A. 
Notes: a Per cent of revenue (removing funds). Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ 
calculations 
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Table 29 focuses on loans, and as expected tax revenue is higher 
than the portfolio average, constituting 25 percent of revenues. This 
is particularly influenced by a loan in a co-financing facility.  
Table 29: Loan Portfolio Mean/Median Tax Payments  
Note: Mean and median Tax Revenue as a Proportion of Revenue removing Funds. Source: 
Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 30 demonstrates the distorting effect of loan co-financing 
facilities and equity funds. Looking at the portfolio companies, the 
mean tax paid as a proportion of revenue looks somewhat more 
realistic than for co-financing facilities.  
Table 30: Total Portfolio Mean Tax Payments by mode of 
finance 
 Co-financing facility Portfolio Company 
 2014 2015 2014 2015 
Observations 3 3 14 12 
Mean Tax Revenuea 93.42% 5.14% 2.40% 2.51% 
Median Tax Revenuea   137.86%b 4.48% 2.13% 0.67% 
Notes: a Per cent of revenue (removing funds). Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ 
calculations. b There are only 3 observations (one is a loan and a portfolio investment) that have 
greater than 100% tax revenue paid. Co-financing facility that provides Mezzanine financing of 
hotel projects in Africa. Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations 
 
In terms of region, Table 31 shows that the great majority of 
respondents are from Africa, followed by Europe, and that mean 
tax revenue are substantially higher in Africa. This may be due to a 
higher presence of co-financing facilities in Africa, however, which 
seems to inflate average tax revenues. 
 
Loan 2014 Loan 2015 
Observations 6 5 
Mean Tax Revenue  25.22% 1.72% 
Median Tax Revenue  2.80% 0.73% 
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Table 31: Total Portfolio Mean/Median Tax Payments as a 
proportion of revenue by region 
Source: Mean and median Tax Revenue as a Proportion of Revenue removing Funds. 
Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations.  
 
With regards to the age of the investments it seems that median tax 
payments reduce as a proportion of EBITDA over vintage (Table 
32). This is to be expected as younger investments would typically 
be made in younger businesses, which may have less tax 
requirements or tax breaks in place for new businesses. 
 
Table 32: Total Portfolio Mean/Median Tax Payments as a 
proportion of revenue by vintage 
Tax year 2014 2015 
Vintage 2000-05 2006-10 2011-15 2000-05 2006-10 2011-15 
Observations 3 7 7 4 6 5 
Mean Tax    94.31% 1.66%   2.77%   6.01% 1.36% 2.66% 
Median Tax  137.86% 0.82% 2.49% 4.48% 0.64% 2.79% 
Notes: Mean and Median Tax Revenue as as  a % of Revenue ex. Funds. Source: Swedfund 
(internal) and authors’ calculations 
 
Table 33 breaks down the tax data by sector. The highest response 
rates are for services and financial Institutions – the other sectors 
had only one observation so were excluded. The key point is that 
services pay more tax than financial institutions. Looking at the 
median tax paid, services pay over double what the financial 
institutions paid in tax as a proportion of revenue, though those 
figures for may have been artificially inflated by the presence of co-
finance institutions.  
 
Africa 
2014 
Africa 
2015 
Asia 
2014 
Asia 
2015 
Europe 
2014 
Europe 
2014 
Observations 9 9 2 1 4 3 
Mean Tax  33.55% 4.45% 1.65% 0.0004% 1.00% 1.32% 
Median Tax  5.24% 4.48% 1.65% 0.0004% 0.31% 0.40% 
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Table 33: Total portfolio mean/median tax payments as a 
proportion of revenue by sector 
 Services Tax Payments 
 Financial Institutions Tax 
 2014 2015 
 2014 2015 
Observations 7 6  6 6 
Mean Tax 42.20% 5.19%  2.79% 2.24% 
Median Tax 5.23% 4.48%  2.58% 1.70% 
Notes: Mean and Median Tax Revenue as a % of Revenue ex. Funds. Source: Swedfund (internal) 
and authors’ calculations 
Perhaps the most important thing to emerge from the tax findings 
is that the data is too limited to be able to draw any meaningful 
conclusions. What we can say is that, for the data we have, tax is 
very volatile, being strongly influenced (and seemingly distorted) by 
the mode of financing, as well as the time period in question. In part, 
this can be explained by the very small sample sizes, which is a 
function of two things: first, the very low response rate to the annual 
survey described above; second, the relatively small size of 
Swedfund’s portfolio, which is of course a more general issue.  
Some ways in which these problems might be addressed are 
considered in the recommendations section. Swedfund’s response 
to some questions on tax are given in Box 3 below. Although these 
are helpful in understanding the difficulties in drawing conclusions 
from tax data, they do not really help us understand why tax 
revenues have varied so much between the years in question.  
Box 3. Behind the data: understanding Swedfund’s approach 
to taxation 
Paying tax is critical if governments are to have the resources they need to 
support development. While Swedfund is therefore right to highlight the 
importance of this, it is difficult in practice to attribute taxes paid – or not – by 
the firms that Swedfund invests in, to its actions, or draw clear conclusions 
from changes in tax paid. As Swedfund put it:  
“A company might expand while no taxes are paid because of temporary tax 
exemptions, or they might contract but their tax payments might increase at 
the same time. Hence, while overall tax payments are useful as a “macro” 
indicator (among many) of a portfolio’s contribution to a country, tax 
payments for individual companies can be very confusing given the large 
  
 
85 
number of unknown variables impacting the actual amount of taxes 
paid/payable.” 
Despite these difficulties, understanding better how Swedfund engages with 
companies on tax, and how data collection on this issue varies, is very 
important. To gain insights on these issues a number of questions were put to 
Swedfund. The questions, and summaries of the responses, are given below.  
1. How does Swedfund seek to influences a company on tax domicile? 
“Tax is part of Swedfund’s extensive due diligence prior to investment. If the 
potential investee does not adhere to the criteria set out in our tax policy, the 
first option is to negotiate and influence the company to change for example 
its tax jurisdiction. If that is not possible, we will not make the investment. If 
we invest in a fund, and the fund in turn is considering investing in a holding 
company that does not adhere to the principles in Swedfund’s tax policy, the 
procedure is the same, i.e. we try to convince the fund and the holding 
company to change its policy.  
If the fund still wants to conduct the investment, Swedfund has the possibility 
to opt out since that has been included in the legal framework of the 
investment. Swedfund adopted its policy on tax in December 2016.” 
“The policy states that Swedfund encourages its investee companies and 
investment partners, with operations in multiple countries, to (i) report tax on 
a country-by-country basis; and (ii) adopt a publically available tax policy that 
refrains from aggressive tax planning and unbalanced profit shifting.” At the 
same time, Swedfunds work on tax has increased significantly the last 2-3 years 
and we are constantly analysing and developing our tools in this area.” 
 
2. Why is tax data less available for loans than equities, and services than 
manufacturing? 
“A greater exposure of our loans is in manufacturing [See Table 8]. This may 
be demonstrative of less data being available as the manufacturing process 
takes time for something to build, for example a hotel or a textile production 
site. The time needed to build and get up and running means that the company 
will contribute to tax revenues after production has started.” 
3. Why were average tax levels consistently higher in 2014 than 2015? 
“There are fluctuations on an aggregated portfolio level due to changes in the 
portfolio, i.e. if we have exited an investment which contributes significantly 
to tax income it shows in our results or if a larger investment is not performing 
well one year, it influences the results.” 
Source: Interview with Swedfund staff  
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 Environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) impacts 
Section 3.22 described the diverse range of ESG material provided 
by Swedfund. In this section, data was provided by Swedfund from 
the 2014 and 2015 Swedfund Portfolio Company Sustainability 
Reports. 21  This refers to a questionnaire filled out by investees 
regarding their processes and development effects, covering audits 
and permits, occupational health and safety, labour and working 
conditions, and stakeholder feedback mechanisms. The 2014 survey 
had 132 questions. The survey primarily focuses on the compliance 
and governance of investees, ensuring that the right procedures and 
systems are in place (e.g. has the firm signed up to ILO guidelines), 
placing less emphasis on the use of those processes (e.g. carbon 
emissions).  
Using these surveys Swedfund can identify areas of concern, 
track progress, and support companies. A number of changes were 
made between the 2014 and 2015 surveys to improve response rates 
and to make the data collected more standardised for analysis. 
Similarly, Swedfund has made efforts to increase the response rate 
to such ESG questionnaires, as their completion was not a 
requirement for investments made prior to Swedfund’s “Policy for 
Sustainable Development” signed in 2010.  
In order to make the most use of the diverse material from these 
questionnaires, we have identified a set of 30 core questions that 
map across the 2014 and 2015 data, for which there was a stronger 
response rate for comparability. Questions were removed from this 
analysis for multiple requirements:  
• If the language is too distinct or non-comparable between 
years  
• If the question refers to the action of a body outside the 
investee organisation (e.g. Have there been any visits or 
                                                 
21 Data was not provided to Swedfund for sustainability questionnaires 
completed by funds, which has slightly different criteria given their nature.  
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inspections from government authorities in order to 
assess…E&S aspects?)  
• If the language is not fixed in the period of the year in 
question (e.g. Has your company performed any training to 
reach [Environmental and Social Management Systems] 
targets?)  
• If the question does not directly relate to implicit 
development impacts (e.g. Have there been changes or 
developments in the Human Resource Policy during the 
reporting period?) 
• If the figure is too output based. To create normalised 
data, many outputs such as water usage may have 
inadvertently penalised some of the more water using 
investments, such as Athi Steel. Such figures require 
context, but also more consistent units (with many 
investees either not reporting water data, producing data 
without units, or reporting in different units) 
The 30 core questions are summarised in Table 34.  
 
Table 34: Core ESG Questions selected 
4. Does your company have a management system in place to manage and 
monitor significant aspects of E&S? 
5a. Does your company have a designated manager or board member 
specifically responsible for E&S issues? 
6. Does your company have an E&S policy (a document showing how the 
company addresses environmental and social issues in the operation of the 
business)?  
7. Has your company made a risk assessment on its operations, identifying and 
documenting the company's environmental and social impact? 
8. Does your company have a health and safety Policy? 
14. Does the company provide drinking water easily accessible and free of 
charge to all employees? 
15. Does the company have toilets and washing facilities sufficient in number, 
to local standards? 
16. Is first aid equipment available?  
Does your company compensate employees for overtime?  
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17. Does the work require personal protective equipment (PPE)? If Yes please 
indicate which type of PPE 
18. Does your company have an emergency and evacuation plan? 
19. Does your company have appropriate fire equipment? 
20. Does your company conduct fire drills? If Yes please indicate frequency?  
21. Does the company have a record of accidents and incidents covering the 
past two years?  
35a. Does your company have a Code of Conduct and/or Human Resource 
Policy?  
35b. Does your company have a Human Rights Policy?  
35c. Does your company have a Child Rights policy? 
35d. Does your company have a Human Resources policy? 
35e. Does your company have an Equal Remuneration Policy? 
35f. Does your company have a Non-discrimination Policy?   
35g. Does your company have a Disciplinary Measures Policy?  
40a. Does your company directly or indirectly anyone under 18, including 
temporary staff?  
41. Do all employees (including temporary staff) have their own employment 
contract?  
49. Does the company directly or indirectly through third party contractors 
employ any forced or bonded labour? 
50a. Do the employees have the formal right to establish and/or join a union?  
51a. Do employees have the right to engage in collective bargaining?  
57. Does your company assess business partners such as subcontractors and 
suppliers in respect to E&S matters?  
62. Does your company have channels for stakeholders to report 
environmental and/or social concerns? 
63. Does your company regularly conduct stakeholder dialogues?  
66. Does your company report publicly on E&S performance and compliance 
with applicable E&S legislation and standards? 
Source: Swedfund (internal)  
 
The next task was to make responses comparable. To this end an 
ESG ‘index’ was created, with responses and scores on each 
question normalised between 0 and 1, where 1 represents the best 
performance and 0 the worst. Each company can then be ascribed 
an ESG score, which captures its performance on the issues 
described in table 33, allowing comparison between different 
companies, and between the same companies over time.  
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As well as being important in its own right, we are interested in 
how ESG performance interacts with financial performance. To 
assess this, a core group of 20 companies for which we have both 
financial and ESG data has been identified. Before analysing this set 
of companies, we need to consider how representative it is of the 
full investment portfolio.  
 
5.2.1 ESG performance by aspects of portfolio22  
 
In terms of value, the set of firms accounts for 19 percent of the 
total portfolio. Chart 4 shows the average ESG performance for the 
two years that we have data. As we can see, there is little change 
between the years, with average performance declining slightly.  
 
Chart 4: Average of Normalised ESG Performance 
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
                                                 
22 All charts presented in this section are compiled using Swedfund internal data.  
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Chart 5 compares ESG performance over time for equities and 
loans. As we can see, loans perform better in general, but also show 
more improvements over time.  
 
Chart 5: ESG Performance by Type of Financing and Year 
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
Equity 2014 Equity 2015 Loan 2014 Loan 2015
  
 
91 
Chart 6 compares ESG performance by vintage. Interestingly, 
newer investments perform considerably worse than older 
investments. One implication of this is that engagement with 
Swedfund leads to improved ESG performance over time.  
 
Chart 6: ESG Performance by Vintage 
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
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Chart 7 compares ESG performance by region and over time. Africa 
is the worst performing region, and also shows no improvement 
over the two years in question. Latin America is the best performing 
region, and also shows the largest improvement from 2014 to 2015. 
Europe is the only region to exhibit a significant deterioration in 
performance, which is explained by a single investment.  
 
Chart 7: ESG Performance by Region 
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations 
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Chart 8 give the same information by sector. Energy was the best 
performing sector in 2014 with a maximum score of 1, but saw a 
significant decline the following year. It should be noted that this is 
a very small sample, but it is interesting to see how ESG 
performance for an individual investment can deteriorate sharply, 
potentially skewing portfolio-level results.  For the other sectors 
(where sample sizes are much larger) no discernible differences can 
be observed.  
Chart 8: ESG Performance by Sector 
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Within ‘services’, we can distinguish sub-sectors. Of these, ‘ports’ 
score very highly on the ESG index and also show significant 
improvement over the two years (~0.8 to 0.9). In contrast, 
‘automotive retail’ has a low score (0.36) and shows little 
improvement (0.38). 
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Chart 9: ESG Performance by Manufacturing Sub Sector 
 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations  
 
Within manufacturing we can see similar variability, as shown in 
Chart 9. Small sample sizes make it impossible to generalise, but this 
does illustrate that a) some sectors are likely to score better on ESG 
indicators than others in terms of ‘initial conditions’, and b) even 
where performance is quite poor, there is significant scope for 
improvement. If we compare the ‘auto parts & equipment’ sector 
with ‘steel’, for example, we see identical scores in 2014. 2015 saw a 
large improvement in ESG performance in the latter, but no change 
at all in the former. This cannot be explained by inherent features 
of the sector, and must therefore be driven by commitment to 
change. 
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Box 4: Behind the data: Swedfund’s Process w. regards to ESG 
Three interesting relationships emerged from the data on ESG performance. 
As in the previous box on financial sustainability, we put these questions to 
Swedfund for context and clarification. The questions, and summaries of 
Swedfund’s answers are given below.  
1. Why is ESG performance better for older than newer investments 
(Chart 6)? 
“In each new investment proposal we include an action plan for environmental 
and social improvement measures to be made over time. This action plan is 
attached to the legal agreement and is a requirement for our portfolio 
companies to comply with. The ESG measures in the action plan can have 
deadlines from 1 month up to several years. This means that older investments 
will have had a longer engagement period from Swedfund and other owners 
which has resulted in changes with regard to ESG-behaviour.  
In addition, over the past 4-5 years our ESG team has grown, we have gained 
more experience, formalised our processes more and the world around as also 
evolved in its approach to ESG. As a result, the requirements and the extent of 
the ESGAPs in our investments have increased over this period on our new 
investments, whereas those with whom we are already invested naturally are 
subject to the agreements signed at the time and only at their own behest 
would sign up to additional requirements.”  
2. Why is ESG performance better for larger than smaller investments 
(Table 35)? 
“Our larger companies may have more resources for environmental and social 
issues. We often see that a company performing well financially also has the 
resources to focus on environmental and social risks and impacts. It also often 
depends on who has the responsibility of ESG matters within the company 
[and our relationship with them].”  
3. Why is ESG performance better where Swedfund’s equity stake is larger 
(Table 35)?  
“When Swedfund owns a larger share of an investment, our potential influence 
in various areas increases. When we own a smaller share, we have to work 
through and with partners...In a larger equity stake we may be able to appoint 
an internal or external person to have a seat on the Board of that company. 
This gives us is a possibility to engage closely with the portfolio company. 
(Example: Salary increase in an investee in the health sector after we made a 
salary comparison for different sectors in the country in question.)” 
Source: Interview with Swedfund staff  
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5.2.2 ESG vs. economic performance 
As well comparing ESG performance by aspects of the portfolio, it 
is interesting to contrast ESG performance with that for the 
financial and economic indicators described above. To facilitate this, 
performance on these indicators was also normalised between 0 and 
1. Sample sizes are too small to generate statistically significant 
results, so the findings summarised in table 35 are indicative rather 
than definitive.  
Table 35: Relationship between ESG and economic and 
financial indicators 
Portfolio 
coverage 
Comparative indicators Suggested 
relationship 
Strength 
Whole 
portfolio 
ESG vs. Employment 2014 Negative Weak 
ESG vs. Employment 2015 Positive  Weak 
ESG vs. revenue 2014 Negative  Weak  
Change ESG vs. revenue change Negative Weak 
ESG vs. EBITDA 2014 Negative  Weak  
ESG vs. EBITDA 2015 Positive  Weak  
Change ESG vs. EBITDA change Positive  Weak  
ESG vs. tax paid 2014  Negative  Weak 
ESG vs. tax paid 2015  Positive Medium 
Equity 
portfolio 
ESG 2014 vs. acquisition value  Negative  Medium 
ESG 2015 vs. acquisition value  Positive Medium 
ESG 2014 vs. initial % stake Negative Strong 
ESG 2015 vs. initial % stake Positive  Medium 
Loan 
portfolio 
ESG 2014 vs. loan size Negative  Medium  
ESG 2015 vs. loan size Positive  Strong 
Source: Swedfund (internal) and authors’ calculations 
 
While there is some indication of relationships these are generally 
weak. The strongest finding is between ESG performance and 
acquisition size (for equities) and loan size. In both cases, there is a 
negative relationship at the time the investment begins, but this 
turns strongly positive in the following year.  
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This suggests that Swedfund may be able to influence 
investments more when its stake is larger. The fact that we find the 
same result for the size of Swedfund’s equity stakes (i.e. the weight 
of its holdings in the company) is supportive of this interpretation.  
 Concluding remarks on ex post impact 
assessment  
In this section we have seen indications that Swedfund is having a 
positive development impact in some areas, though the very limited 
historically comparable data, absence of baselines, and very variable 
response rates to survey questions makes it impossible to state this 
with any certainty.  
At the portfolio level, investees have seen improved revenue and 
EBITDA performance, though net employment creation has been 
negative. These aggregate findings mask significant differences by 
investment mode and vintage however, as well as smaller differences 
by region and sector.  
For investment mode, financial losses are concentrated in equity 
investments, particularly a small number of large investments made 
through equity funds. In contrast, the financial performance of the 
loan portfolio is positive. A conclusion that could be drawn is that 
Swedfund should continue to increase its use of loans relative to 
equities. The first point to make on this is that losses are focused in 
equity fund investments rather than those made directly by 
Swedfund. The case is therefore strongest for reducing these types 
of investments. As we are concerned with development impact, 
there are other reasons to support this shift. Investment in a firm’s 
equity gives Swedfund significant influence, particularly as it 
generally obtains a seat on the board. As we saw in the ESG section, 
there is some indications that Swedfund may have used this 
influence to improve performance on ESG issues. If so, this appears 
to be more likely for larger investments and where Swedfund’s stake 
is greatest. This makes sense intuitively. 
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Investments through equity funds (and other financial 
intermediaries) do not offer this opportunity for influence. The 
same is true for loans of course. While increasing the share of loans 
in the portfolio could be positive for financial performance, there 
could be a trade-off in terms of the potential for additional 
development impact. An important point to note is that the overall 
improvement in the financial performance of Swedfund’s 
investments, may be driven by the increase weighting given to loans 
relative to equities, rather than to the influence of Swedfund over 
its investees.  
More generally, the concentration of losses in the equity portfolio 
highlights the risks that Swedfund faces. Given its relatively small 
size, scope for diversification of risk is limited. As Swedfund is 
increasingly focused on lower-income countries, this problem may 
increase. A core recommendation emerging from the ex-ante impact 
assessment is that Swedfund should focus on countries where needs 
are greatest. These are also likely to be higher risk. By definition, 
seeking to achieve greater development impact by investing in 
places where the needs are greatest increases the risk of losses.  
Turning to employment effects, we see a net fall across the 
portfolio as a whole. Again, however, these are not evenly 
distributed but concentrated in older investments, Asian 
investments, manufacturing, and investments made through equity 
funds. Younger investments – particularly those in Africa – were 
more likely to see net job creation over the period considered. The 
loan portfolio saw net job creation, particularly in more recent loans, 
and those located in Africa. The arguments made against investing 
through equity funds are also valid here. As well as seeing the largest 
reductions in employment, Swedfund’s ability to influence these 
investments – both to improve financial performance (thus 
protecting jobs) and to directly influence employment practices – is 
more limited than in equity investments. The explanation for the 
better employment performance of the loan portfolio is unclear, but 
the case for balancing equity and loans made above, and particularly 
for maintaining direct equity investments as a large part of the 
portfolio, also holds.  
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Despite the relatively small sample of ESG data for 2014/2015, 
ESG performance looks relatively static at a portfolio level. Half of 
the sample improved their performance, while 45 percent saw a 
deterioration, but these were relatively minor except for one or two 
investments. This is to be expected when looking at processes 
compared to outputs, which may vary more significantly on a year 
to year basis. We also note the better ESG performance of older 
investments and loans and take this as a possible sign of the success 
of Swedfund’s engagement with actors.  
Finally, we note the relationship between ESG performance and 
acquisition size (for equities) and loan size. The negative relationship 
at the time the investment begins turns strongly positive in the 
following year, suggesting that Swedfund may have greater 
influencing ability with larger stakes in the investee. This result was 
supported by similar results in Swedfund’s equity stakes. As 
elsewhere in this evaluation, the data available is too limited for 
these findings to be any more than suggestive.  
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6. Ex-ante framework to maximise 
additionality  
In section 4.1, we assessed Swedfund’s impact on an ex-ante basis, 
focusing on the regions, countries and sectors that are invested in. 
Drawing on the literature previously reviewed, this was based on the 
rationale that greater impacts can be achieved through more 
strategic asset allocation. This relates to links 2 and 6 of the causal 
chain described in section 3.1. 
In this final section we expand on this logic, and identify other 
ways that Swedfund could enhance its development impact. This 
can be thought of as an ‘additionality framework’, where the 
different ways that Swedfund could create positive development 
impacts are distinguished and discussed. How this could be 
operationalised would depend on integration into existing 
procedures and practices, so we do not make explicit 
recommendations in this regard. In any event, the details matter less 
than that Swedfund develops effective mechanisms to maximise 
impact across the full range of areas.  
The section is informed by the literatures reviewed above, as well 
as the research linking DFI and challenge fund activities and 
financial instruments as well as private sector development (PSD) 
(including SMEs) with development outcomes in developing 
countries. 
The various types of additionality considered are financial 
additionality, sector additionality, project selection additionality, 
financial design additionality, and management additionality. We do 
not consider the issue of asset allocation by location, as this is 
addressed above in some detail.  
 Financial additionality 
For some, financial additionality is created ‘by offering financing to 
financially sustainable projects which would otherwise have been 
rejected by the existing capital market’ (Sjö and Flygare, 2008:12). A 
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more nuanced way of looking at this is to also consider the type of 
financing. It may be possible to obtain short-term expensive finance 
for example, but the project may require long-term affordable 
finance. Financial additionality in this sense is therefore the supply 
of the right kind of finance that would otherwise have been 
unavailable. 
For Romero and Van de Poel (2014) and IEG (2013) financial 
additionality is much more likely in less developed countries, as 
financing is generally scarcer. To continue the previous point, it is 
also the case that longer-term and/or affordable finance is 
particularly scarce in these countries. For similar reasons, 
investments in smaller companies tend to be more financially 
additional as they are less well served by financial markets, and by 
DFIs (Heinrich, 2014; Griffiths et al., 2014). Investments in 
companies domiciled in developing countries are also more likely to 
be additional since they are usually more credit constrained than 
those domiciled elsewhere. Relatedly, leverage ratios tend to be 
higher in higher-income countries and larger companies, but this 
does not prove additionality, since it is less likely that DFI 
investment was necessary for the investment to happen (Pereira, 
2015). More broadly, as suggested by Heinrich (2014): ‘the more 
risky and innovative a proposed business project is, the more likely 
it is that donor support is additional’ (p. 7).  
As well as location, timing is also important. For example, DFI 
financial additionality was found to be strongly related to global 
market liquidity and risk conditions (Mutambatsere and Arvanitis, 
2012) and was particularly apparent in times of crisis (IFC, 2011). 23 
For Massa (2011) a 10 percent increase in DFIs’ commitments 
increases per capita GDP by 1.3 percent in lower-income countries, 
and 0.9 percent in higher-income countries. As well as suggesting 
                                                 
23 FMO and the German Investment Corporation (DEG) were able to provide a 
7.5 year senior unsecured tranche when commercial finance dried up after 2008, 
and where they thus became ‘lenders of last resort’. This is likely to have 
increased their additionality at this time, and ‘suggests that additionality depends 
on international economic trends’ (Carnegie Consult and ODI, 2014: 23). 
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additionality, this also supports the view that this will be greater in 
lower-income countries.  
 Sector additionality 
In section 2.1.4, we reviewed the evidence relating different sectors 
to potential development impacts. Further insights from the PSD 
and challenge fund literatures are provided here.  
For specific benefits of investments in infrastructure, in the 
context of Latin American countries, Sandell and Hernández (2012) 
found that the infrastructure sector was ‘key for technological 
development and improving competitiveness in the global markets’, 
which in turn may lead to faster growth and poverty reduction. 
In the PSD/challenge fund literature the arguments in favour of 
investment in agriculture are reinforced. These include the fact that 
agriculture-driven growth is two to four times more effective in 
reducing poverty than growth in other sectors (CAFOD, 2011; 
AfDB, 2013). It is not just growth that matters, but ensuring that 
growth is as pro-poor as possible. Given its importance in lower 
income countries, the agricultural sector is uniquely important in 
this regard (Suryadarma and Suryahadi (2007). Fan and Rao (2003) 
find that government spending on agriculture, irrigation, education, 
and roads contribute significantly to agricultural growth, and that 
‘agricultural growth is the most crucial engine for poverty alleviation 
in rural areas’ (cited in Suryadarma and Suryahadi, 2007: 2).  
The literature also confirms that labour-intensive sectors are 
particularly important for poverty-reduction. A review of the 
impacts of challenge funds on poverty finds the greatest impacts in 
labour-intensive sectors (garment production, horticulture) in 
Vietnam and Ethiopia respectively (Triodos Facet, 2010). 
Furthermore, a report on the linkages between IFIs and PSD also 
stated the importance of investing in labour-intensive sectors (IFC, 
2011: 10).  
The OECD (2006) proposes that donors invest in sectors where 
returns are low or deferred, such as education, healthcare, housing, 
small business, farming and refinancing (this also has implications 
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for financial additionality of course). In terms of sectors, health and 
education are found to be important for private sector growth in 
developing countries, as is infrastructure (Griffiths et al., 2014). 
Bateman (2013) states that for DFIs to enhance their 
development impact, they will need to strengthen support to 
frontier sectors that have ‘high added value and local competitive 
advantages’ (cited in Romero and Van de Poel, 2014, p. 38). 
 Project selection  
Within a particular sector, a number of aspects of projects can affect 
development potential, which could inform DFIs selection 
processes.  
6.3.1 Firm size 
Do smaller or larger firms contribute more to poverty reduction? 
Overall, the literature finds that investments in larger firms 
contribute more to total employment growth than investments in 
SMEs. Various studies, including a meta-regression analysis, find 
evidence to support this claim (e.g. Macqueen, 2005; CAFOD, 2013; 
Piza et al., 2016). These studies also find that job security and 
conditions tend to be worse for smaller firms.  
On the other hand, SMEs were found to: better serve the poor 
by providing affordable products (Karnani, 2006); be more dynamic 
and innovative; more embedded in the local culture; and more 
seasonal, diurnal or nocturnal, which favours women (Macqueen, 
2005). Further, it is argued that SMEs can play a multidimensional 
role on poverty reduction, by helping to reduce ‘insecurity and 
powerlessness, social inequity, mass production drudgery, ecological 
or landscape uniformity and loss of cultural identity’ (Macqueen, 
2005: 7).  
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6.3.2 Domiciles of investment companies and tax 
havens 
Investing in companies domiciled in developing countries can 
contribute more to the competitiveness of locally-owned industry, 
the mobilisation of domestic resources and the generation of taxes 
for domestic governments (APRODEV, 2013; Romero, 2014). 
However, between 2006 and 2010 only a quarter of EIB and IFC 
investments were domiciled in low-income countries (Romero, 
2014). Furthermore, despite the negative impact on domestic 
resource mobilisation, APRODEV (2013: 6) states that ‘all DFIs 
appear to use them [tax havens]’. Most DFIs do not report taxes 
generated on a company-by-company basis, making it impossible to 
assess performance in this regard.  
6.3.3 Goods & services 
Since the poor spend 80 percent of their income on food, clothing 
and fuel, these goods need to become cheaper for them to benefit 
through consumption (Karnani, 2006). For Karnani (ibid.) the only 
way to reduce the price of such goods is either to reduce their 
quality, or improve the technology used to produce these goods. 
Others would argue that increasing competition between firms, and 
improving transport links can enable G&S to reach new areas, while 
putting downward pressure on prices and upward pressure on 
quality. Moreover, approaches aimed at targeting Bottom of the 
Pyramid (BoP) consumers tend not to provide lower-quality goods, 
while technology improvements, while useful, have rarely occurred 
in the recent past with these types of products.  
To date, DFIs have paid very little attention to these issues, 
suggesting scope to increase development impact through giving 
more consideration to the G&S produced and sold by investee 
firms. One exception in this regard is the increased focus on 
renewable energy provision by Swedfund, as well as other DFIs. 
Off-grid energy has the potential to supply energy to previously 
unserved rural areas. 
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 Financial design  
Overall, the literature provides no conclusive evidence as to the type 
of financial instruments that tend to have more beneficial 
developmental outcomes. Indeed, Romero (2014:10) states that 
‘[t]here is little theoretical or empirical evidence available to support 
any particular instrument, from a development perspective’, while 
Romero and Van de Poel (2014: 40) mention that ‘questions remain 
as to which financial sector is needed and what are the appropriate 
(sic) ways to foster local enterprise development and growth and the 
sustainable development of local economies’. 
In previous sections we discussed the potential development 
benefits of equity investment. From a financial perspective, another 
advantage is that risks are more shared with equities than loans – i.e. 
if circumstances deteriorate the equity investor shares this risk and 
vice versa. On the other hand, loans have the advantage of offering 
certainty over required payments, but the disadvantage of potentially 
creating an unsustainable debt burden.  
The other main form of instrument used by DFIs is guarantees, 
which are mainly used to ‘reduce the risk of investment so that 
capital will be attracted towards high-risk projects’ (Romero and 
Van de Poel, 2014: 22). While this implies they are a potentially 
useful instrument for DFIs, there is some debate on this question, 
as reported in Bracking and Ganho (2011). One reported advantage 
is that “when guarantees are priced to reflect risk, they make it more 
likely for the SME program overall to show net [financial] benefits 
in the end” (Klein, 2010). Another is that they could help build 
capacity of participating banks. Despite these theoretical 
advantages, there is relatively little evidence on the impact of credit 
guarantees on firms. One study found government credit guarantee 
schemes helped firms maintain their size and increased their survival 
rate, but did not improve investment or R&D (Oh et al., 2009, cited 
in Piza et al., 2016). Another reported effects of credit guarantee 
schemes are that firms invest more in less capital-intensive 
technology, which may be more ‘pro-poor’ (Karnani, 2006). Overall, 
credit guarantee schemes are thought to be beneficial to firms, with 
some evidence attesting to this.  
       
106 
Although 15 out of 20 DFIs from around the world use 
guarantee schemes, five do not. One reason for this is that some 
DFIs are only mandated to offer ODA-eligible finance, and 
guarantees may not quality as they do not constitute financial flows. 
(Romero and Van de Poel, 2014).  
 Management additionality 
As discussed in the context of equity investment above, 
development impacts can potentially be enhanced through direct or 
indirect management influence. As well as this impact channel, a few 
other elements are worth mentioning. In the context of challenge 
funds, Heinrich (2014) discussed how DFIs can use the application 
stage to enhance the project proposal by the company, e.g. to make 
it more pro-poor, environmentally sustainable or commercially 
viable. Other reports have made similar findings (Coffey 
International Development, 2013; Poulton, 2009). 
DFIs may also be able to use their influence – as well as their 
knowledge of the wider market systems – to encourage greater 
integration in supply chains. CAFOD (2013) finds that small 
businesses are often stamped out of competition by incoming FDI, 
which often operates at larger scales and sophistication, and that 
policies of DFIs to ‘level the playing field’ for SMEs do not work. 
This is because interventions to include SMEs into supply chains 
don’t address the power relations extant within the supply chain. 
Instead, the report suggests that benefits could be increased if DFIs 
also focus on supporting people and SMEs to influence local and 
national policy spaces (CAFOD, 2013). 
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7. Conclusions and 
recommendations 
Returning to the question motivating the research, this evaluation 
concludes that it is not possible to say definitively whether 
Swedfund has reduced poverty through its activities. As discussed 
throughout the report, the data available is simply too limited to 
enable a firm view to be reached. Having said that, we do find 
indications that Swedfund is having a positive impact on poverty in 
some respects, and may also have positively affected the ESG 
performance of the firms in which it invests.  
Swedfund has increasingly shifted its operations towards low-
income, capital scarce countries. The question of financial 
additionality is largely being addressed through this change. It is 
possible that Swedfund’s investments in these countries are 
crowding out a pool of private capital in a general sense, but this 
seems unlikely. It is more likely that, for some investments, it would 
have been possible to raise financing from private sources rather 
than from Swedfund. While this brings into question whether 
financing is purely additional, it does not undermine the investment 
case. As we have seen, Swedfund has the potential to create 
additional development impacts in a number of areas other than the 
straight provision of finance – the way that it uses its management 
influence over companies, for example. The fact that Swedfund may 
have improved the ESG performance of some of its investments, is 
supportive of this potential.   
Where financial additionality is less clear, the onus on Swedfund 
increases to ensure that other forms of potential impact are 
maximised. While there are some indications of positive effects in 
these area, these are currently not being maximised in our view. 
Developing a more systematic ex-ante framework such as that 
proposed in section 6 is an important part of this, as it makes it more 
likely that influence will be maximised through the life-cycle of each 
investment.  
A final opportunity for impact relates to exit. There is a risk that 
where progress has been made – for example, with respect to 
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workers’ rights – these do not survive Swedfund’s exit. This is 
particularly likely where a sale is made to an institution that does not 
share Swedfund’s development objectives. While it may not be 
possible to avoid this entirely, efforts should be made to ensure a 
positive development legacy. Part of this may be achieved by 
demonstrating that being a good ‘corporate citizen’ is compatible 
with financial sustainability through the investment process. It also 
implies that care should be taken when exiting equity positions in 
terms of the choice of buyer.  
While there is significant scope for greater impact, things do 
seem to be moving in the right direction in some areas. Results from 
more recent investments are generally stronger than from older 
investments, for example. Although the financial performance of 
recent investments is stronger than older investments, however, 
these are concentrated in the loan rather than the equity portfolio, 
suggesting that – at least in part – these effects are the result of a 
shift into less risky types of investments (i.e. loans) and a reduction 
in the weight of higher risk investments (particularly through equity 
funds). Improved financial performance may therefore be driven 
more by a shift in asset allocation, than in the influence of Swedfund 
on the companies in which they invest. On the other hand, the fact 
that, within the loan portfolio, there is some variability (e.g. African 
loans perform better), might suggest that Swedfund is able to exert 
a greater positive influence in some contexts than others. Because 
of the data issues described above, it is impossible to clearly assess 
this.  
Results for both employment and tax are very difficult to 
interpret. For employment, there is also some evidence that more 
recent investments have performed better, but this may also be 
influenced by the changes to asset allocation described above. For 
tax, little can be said. The data available is very limited, and heavily 
distorted by results from equity funds. Excluding these from the 
analysis makes the sample size issue worse.  
As well as small sample sizes, we also have very limited time 
coverage. At most there is three years of data, and in some cases – 
i.e. key tax ratios – only two. It is impossible to draw meaningful 
conclusions on impact in this circumstances. For tax, it would be 
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very difficult to draw conclusions on Swedfund’s tax impacts even 
with more data, as so many other factors influence how much tax is 
paid and when it is paid. While this is a challenge, it is not an 
insurmountable one. In the recommendations section below, we 
make some suggestions on how it could be addressed.  
ESG performance, in contrast to economic indicators, is 
generally better for firms that Swedfund has been involved with for 
some time – rather than newer firms. We interpret this positively, 
agreeing with Swedfund that this may well be evidence of the 
positive impact that engagement can have over the longer term. The 
same caveats with respect to sample size and time covered also apply 
here.  
These factors suggest that Swedfund is likely to be generating 
some poverty impact by providing additional capital where it is 
needed (ex ante assessment), and also positively influencing the 
ESG performance of some of the firms in which it invests (based 
on indications of ex post results data). It may also be having a 
positive influence on financial performance, though this is more 
difficult to attribute to Swedfund’s activities, as it could be explained 
by changes in the portfolio in terms of reduction in risk-profile. For 
employment and tax, we do not discern any clear impact.  
Given data and sample size issues, it is not possible to say more 
than this. It is possible that Swedfund’s impact is much larger than 
it appears. It could also be lower. We simply do not know. This 
raises two important questions: First, how could Swedfund 
significantly increases its poverty impacts? Second, how can these 
impacts be robustly measured and used to inform a dynamic 
improvement in impact over time? 
For the first question, Swedfund, as with all DFIs, faces a trade-
off. Its impacts will be greatest – and the additionality of its 
investment surer – when it invests in countries, regions and sectors 
where the need for investment is greatest. Here the potential 
impacts on poverty are largest. Unfortunately, risks are also likely to 
be the greatest in these situations. We have seen that Swedfund faces 
significant financial risks, where losses can be concentrated in a few 
investments. The increase in the proportion of loans in the portfolio 
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is one response to this. Another way of dealing with this issue would 
be to invest in lower risk ventures, but this would undermine the 
impacts that Swedfund is trying to achieve, as well as calling into 
question the extent to which its investments are financially 
additional. 
We see two positive ways that this could be addressed. First, the 
focus on higher-risk, more potentially impactful investments could 
be accelerated, with an acceptance that losses will be higher and 
Swedfund may not be able to operate on a financially self-sufficient 
basis. This would require regular injections of capital from the 
Government, but this can be justified on the basis of impact. 
Second, Swedfund’s financial sustainability could potentially be 
maintained if risks were mitigated through greater diversification. 
This would require Swedfund to be substantially larger than is 
currently the case, however. Again, this would require a capital 
injection from government, possibly a quite large one, but this 
would be a one-off designed to enable Swedfund to reach a 
sustainable size such that risks could be well diversified.  
If neither of these routes are taken, and Swedfund faces pressure 
to be financially self-sufficient, then it is likely that development 
impacts will reduce, as survival will require a less risky (and therefore 
less potentially impactful) portfolio of investments. While there 
would still be development impacts in these circumstances, and 
these could be enhanced through the different forms of additionality 
discussed previously, total impacts will be less than could be 
achieved.  
Both options require additional capital, either on an annual basis, 
or as a one-off. To justify this, Swedfund would need to enhance its 
development impacts, and demonstrate clearly that it is doing so. 
This brings us back to the second question posed above: how can 
impacts be robustly measured and used to inform a dynamic 
improvement in impact over time? With respect to quantitative 
evaluations, a key issue is sample size. The second option, where 
Swedfund significantly expands its portfolio, would help to address 
this.  
Although a larger portfolio would make robust measurement of 
impact more feasible, it certainly does not guarantee this. An 
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important issue in this regard is indicators. Swedfund, as with all 
DFIs, seeks to obtain data on a very large number of indicators. This 
is problematic for two reasons. First, more important indicators are 
not differentiated from less important ones, so that the former are 
‘drowned out’ by the latter. Second, a very large set of indicators 
makes it difficult to ensure internal consistency, such that indicators 
do not contradict each other. Rather than measure more and more 
things, a better approach would be to be very clear about which 
impacts are most important to Swedfund, and then choose the 
minimum number of indicators that best capture these.  
As well as limiting their number, indicators should be designed 
such that meaning cannot be obscured or misinterpreted. For 
example, tax questions should be designed to elicit clearly how much 
tax is paid in each jurisdiction as a proportion of economic 
activity/profits.  
Robust evaluation also requires comparable indicators to be used 
over time. There is no alternative to talking a long-term view, and 
putting in place a simple, coherent measurement system that is 
maintained over a lengthy period. This may make it impossible to 
definitely assess impacts for some years, but there are no short-cuts 
to achieving this. Swedfund faces regular calls from its shareholder 
and other actors to focus on new areas, and no doubt this will 
continue. The key is to ensure that this does not disrupt the 
monitoring of impact in core areas over the longer term. Again, 
ensuring that this ‘core’ is as simple and clear as possible, makes this 
more likely to be sustainable.  
A final point is data coverage. Response rates to Swedfund’s 
annual survey are poor in some areas, particularly taxation. There 
are many things that could be done to improve this, but a simple 
solution could be to make this part of the contractual obligations of 
investee firms.  
If Swedfund does not expand, but increases its risk appetite as 
suggested above, sample size issues cannot be addressed as readily. 
This does not remove the importance of indicator selection, 
however, quite the opposite. Methodologically, serious thought 
should also be applied to putting in place robust small-N methods, 
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to measure impacts, and assess Swedfund’s contribution to these 
impacts, again over the longer term. It is outside the scope of this 
paper to go into detail in this respect, but a combination of natural 
experiments and comparative case-studies are likely to be important.  
Broadly, DFIs tend to move together in their activities and the 
way they assess these. There is much to be gained from pooling 
resources and from mutual learning. There is also a risk that this 
stifles innovation and diversity. We know a lot about how to invest 
to support the private sector in developing countries, but we 
certainly do not know everything. Now the importance of the 
private sector is properly reflected in the SDGs, and the importance 
of DFIs in fostering PSD is increasingly recognised, it is essential 
that DFIs maximise their impact in everything they do. This requires 
a bit more strategic thinking and risk-taking. Difficult perhaps, but 
not impossible.  
Our recommendations are that: 
• Swedfund’s focus on low-income countries and the sectors 
with the greatest potential development impact within 
these countries is strengthened. 
• To address the increase in investment risk this would 
create we propose two options: 
i) Swedfund becomes a specialist DFI focusing on high-
risk/high-impact investments, but accepts that this will 
increase losses in the portfolio, and require regular 
capital injections from government to support this. 
ii) Swedfund expands significantly and develops a more 
diversified portfolio to mitigate risk. This would enable 
the focus on high-risk/impact investments to continue, 
but within the context of a more diversified portfolio. 
While this diversification would make it possible for 
Swedfund to retain financial self-sufficiency, it would 
require a significant, one-off capital injection.  
• The most important development impacts that Swedfund 
is seeking to achieve are identified, and as few indicators as 
possible are developed to capture these impacts. Rather 
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than rely on DFI norms, there is a good argument that 
these should be designed on a bespoke basis to fit with 
Swedfund’s objectives and goals.  
• Indicators should be designed to be unambiguous.  
• An ex-ante framework is developed to select the sectors 
and projects with the greatest potential impacts. 
• Baselines are taken at the point of investment, and a core 
of impact indicators gathered consistently over the life of 
the investment, with investee companies required to 
respond.  
• More consideration is given to exit, in terms of ensuring a 
development legacy, and follow-up occurs with exited 
investments.  
• Appropriate evaluation methods are used to assess impact. 
Generally, these should be a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, with issues such as sample size, 
causality and attribution given full consideration.  
• The results of ex post impact assessments are used to 
inform sector and project selection (i.e. the ex-ante 
framework evolves over time in the light of achieved 
impacts). 
• More resources are devoted to monitoring and evaluation, 
and used as efficiently as possible.  
If none of these recommendations are followed, then Swedfund 
may have a positive impact on poverty, but this will not be as large 
as it could be and it will be impossible to rigorously assess. If neither 
of the two structural reform options are considered possible, the 
recommendations on indicators, data and methods would still 
address some of these issues, however, and should be considered 
seriously. In our view, a combination of structural reform and a 
concerted effort to streamline and strengthen M&E practices, 
would put in a place a dynamic whereby poverty impacts could both 
rise progressively over time and be increasingly accurately measured.  
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